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What does it mean to be a fiduciary and does it really matter whether the 
law labels a person a fiduciary or not? Until the late twentieth century 
Delaware corporate law could have given a singular, coherent answer to 
these questions. Today, to its detriment, it is no longer able to do so.  
In Delaware’s original understanding of fiduciary relations, a fiduciary 
was merely a legal label applied to a person who is subject to legal 
obligations arising from her undertaking to perform a representative 
position or role and her empowerment to perform that role. This conception 
is referred to in this article as the “power/undertaking conception” of 
fiduciary relations. In this conception, the fiduciary duties she owes are not 
the product of her being designated “a fiduciary,” rather they arise from or 
are implied in the undertaking and empowerment. Victor Morawetz, one of 
New York’s leading late-nineteenth century corporate lawyers, referred to 
these obligations as the “implied condition[s]”1  of delegated discretion. 
Earlier, and more foundationally, as Lord Holt put it in the 1703 case of 
Coggs v. Barnard: “[the] undertaking obliges the undertaker to a diligent 
management.” 2  Accordingly, in this power/undertaking conception of 
fiduciary relations, the duty of good faith (which evolved into the business 
judgment rule) 3  and the duty of care are inherent in the agreement to 
perform and to be empowered to perform the representational role. 
Similarly, the duty to avoid a conflict of duty and personal interest, which 
evolved in the United States to provide for fairness review of self-dealing 
transactions,4 is a corollary of the agreement to act in good faith to further 
the purpose for which the power was delegated—it ensures that the exercise 
of the delegated discretion is not infected with personal financial interest.5 
As Lord Eldon, the father of modern fiduciary law, put it in 1802, a fiduciary 
cannot “manage for the benefit and advantage of himself.”6  
These obligations orbit the fiduciary’s exercise of delegated power. In 
the corporate context, as those powers are the corporation’s powers and as 
the corporation appoints those who exercise those powers, necessarily these 
fiduciary duties are owed to and enforced by the corporation. Likewise, 
anyone who usurps corporate power, such as a majority shareholder who 
 
1. VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 483 (2d ed. 
1886). 
2. (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 113; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 919 (QB). 
3. See DAVID KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE FIDUCIARY 
LAW 68–92 (2018). 
4. See id. at 329–41 and 361–68 (requiring a fair, arm’s length price). 
5. See MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF 
NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 32–34, 61–62 (2010). 












controls and directs the exercise of board power, owes the consequential 
duties to the corporation.  
This power/undertaking conception of fiduciary relations was the 
conception of fiduciary relations in U.S. corporate law in the nineteenth and 
most of the twentieth century. It is a conception upon which most of the 
fiduciary law taught in a JD corporations course today was structured and 
built. However, commencing in the mid-twentieth century, and in the late 
twentieth century in Delaware corporate law, a different conception of the 
fiduciary was born; a conception also rooted in Lord Eldon’s equity 
jurisprudence and the concern about the ability of one party to take 
advantage of and exercise undue influence over another in the context of 
transactions such as contracts and gifts. When applicable this undue 
influence doctrine required proof that the transaction was the product of a 
fair process, and in some instances, evidence that the agreed upon price was 
also fair. This doctrine, therefore, provided a separate legal pathway to 
entire fairness review. 
Although this undue influence doctrine has nothing to do with traditional 
fiduciary obligation it was often applicable to power/undertaking fiduciaries 
who, in relation to certain transactions, were able to take advantage of their 
charge and exercise influence. 7  It was, however, equally applicable to 
persons in such a superior position, even where they were not 
power/undertaking fiduciaries. But although such relations of potential 
advantage and influence were never “fiduciary” relations, courts in several 
U.S. states (including Delaware) in the early- to mid-20th century began to 
designate such relations of superiority and inferiority as fiduciary. This 
article explores the foundations and infusion of this “influence conception” 
of fiduciary relations, with particular regard to its central and recent role in 
Delaware corporate law on going-private transactions.8 
As a result of this influence infusion, Delaware courts began to deploy 
the designation of fiduciary and the idea of fiduciary duties in relation to 
two wholly separate legal ideas, generating within Delaware law two 
independent structures of “fiduciary” obligation. In one, the traditional 
power/undertaking conception, the existence of fiduciary duties is 
dependent on the transfer of power and the duties are the discrete, 
endogenous product of the undertaking to act and the empowerment to act. 
The term fiduciary in this conception merely labels someone who is subject 
to such obligation—it is a product not a source of obligation. In the other, 
 
7. The undue influence doctrine’s application to directors provided a separate pathway to 
fairness review (price and process) of directorial self-dealing. See KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 341–69. 
8. In this article “going-private transactions” and “going-privates” refer to transactions 
involving the purchase by the majority shareholder/parent company of the minority shares in the 
subsidiary company or the merger of parent and subsidiary. 











the influence conception, duty is sourced in an abstract and broad loyalty 
obligation which is the product of being designated a fiduciary. And in this 
conception, there is no power limitation on who can be a fiduciary; the 
designation is a function of the extent of the superiority and domination, and 
a judicially imposed threshold for such extent. These two conceptions, 
therefore, offer profoundly different ideas about the nature and source of 
duty and obligation and provide for very different judicial roles in 
delineating fiduciary obligation. 
Delaware corporate law, however, has no sight of how the conception of 
the fiduciary has been transformed in the past half century; it pays little 
attention to what is under the bonnet of the concepts of the fiduciary and 
fiduciary duty, and its standard bearers such as entire fairness. It has 
therefore no sight of how the influence conception has affected the way it 
thinks about fiduciary obligation. Today Delaware law is peppered with 
questions and problems which are the product of the structural changes that 
the introduction of the fiduciary influence conception has wrought. This 
article focuses only on the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders and 
on the question of whether directors owe direct duties of care to creditors, 
but there are other problems—for example, Delaware’s difficulty in 
distinguishing between direct and derivative actions. In several instances, 
these questions and problems would have made no sense and would have 
been given short shrift in the absence of this conceptual and structural 
change.  
Moreover, policy debate and empirical inquiry evolve from these new 
questions, but often with no sense of why they became questions at all. 
Without close attention to the evolution and source of these legal ideas, 
concepts, and structures, our policy debates are flying blind. This is not to 
say, of course, that the legal questions and answers which are the product of 
these new structures, and the changes to the judicial role which they bring 
about, do not offer superior tools and methods for addressing corporate 
activity and relations; they may. But as a prerequisite to their effective 
evaluation, we should know where these questions come from. Attention to 
the conceptual evolution of the idea of the fiduciary set forth in this article 
allows us to see where they come from.  
The article is structured as follows. Part I explores the different 
conceptions of fiduciary relations. It first explores the power/undertaking 
conception of fiduciary relations in relation to directors and majority 
shareholders and shows how statements in U.S. corporate law that appear 
inconsistent with it—because they suggest duties are owed outside of the 
corporation, such as directorial duties to stockholders or majority 
shareholder duties to minority shareholders—are often on closer inspection 












of the undue influence doctrine, its importation into Delaware law, and its 
implications for the nature and structure of fiduciary obligation. Part II of 
the Article considers the application of these fiduciary conceptions to 
controlling shareholders, first highlighting the initial dominance in U.S. law 
generally, and Delaware law in particular, of the power/undertaking 
conception, and second, documenting the rise and impact of the influence 
conception in Delaware going-private law. Part III provides another 
example of the effects of the infusion of the fiduciary influence conception 
in the context of whether director’s fiduciary duties are owed directly to 
creditors. The Conclusion concludes. 
I. HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATION 
Much digital ink has been spilt over the nature and categorization of 
fiduciary relationships and obligations.9 For example, for Professors De 
Mott and (now Mr. Justice) Finn, central to the determination of whether a 
person is a fiduciary is whether the relationship generates a legitimate or 
reasonable expectation of loyalty on the part of the beneficiary; 10  for 
Professors Frankel, Miller, Lionel Smith, Shepherd, and Weinrib the 
transfer or delegation of power to act on behalf of another is the defining 
characteristic or hallmark of fiduciary relations;11 whereas for Professors 
Scott and (now Mr. Justice) Edelman, the fiduciary obligation and the label 
fiduciary is sourced in the undertaking to act on behalf of another given by 
the fiduciary; 12  and for Professor Gordon Smith, fiduciary and non-
fiduciary relations are demarcated by what it is in relation to which the 
fiduciary or non-fiduciary acts—where critical resources exposed to 
opportunistic behaviour are subject to fiduciary protection.13 
Two factors account for this theoretical variation and disagreement: 
conceptual emphasis and the jurisdictional variation in the legal ideas 
contained within fiduciary discourse. The first factor is straightforward. 
 
9. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 
1988 DUKE. L.J. 879, 908–15; see also CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 245–54. 
10. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and 
Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936 (2006); see also Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL [No. 
2] (2012) 287 ALR 22, 57–58 (Austl.). 
11. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 808–09 (1983) (noting also the 
“substitution role of the fiduciary”); Paul B. Miller, The Idea of Status in Fiduciary Law, in CONTRACT, 
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 25, 48 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016); Lionel Smith, 
Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgement on Behalf of Another, 130 L. Q. 
REV. 608, 610 (2014); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 96 (1981); Ernest J. Weinrib, The 
Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L. J. 1, 7 (1975). 
12. Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 544 (1949); James 
Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 L. Q. REV. 302, 314 (2010).  
13. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1402 (2002). 











Much of the theoretical literature has more in common than the theories 
often allow for. Gordon Smith, for example, focuses on critical resources, 
but his theory assumes an agreement to act and empowerment.14 Tamar 
Frankel, Lionel Smith, and Jay Shepherd elevate power, but they necessarily 
make and acknowledge space for the consent and agreement to act, which 
is commonly referred to as a fiduciary’s undertaking.15  That is, for the 
student of fiduciary law there is more agreement than the number of articles 
and theories of fiduciary law might suggest. The second factor is more 
significant and drives theory proliferation and actual disagreement: courts 
in some jurisdictions, most notably in the United States, have come to use 
the idea of fiduciary relations to reflect what are, historically situated, two 
distinctive legal ideas. These ideas address distinctive problems and have 
distinctive, indeed wholly unrelated, understandings of the nature and scope 
of any duty applicable to the respective problems; that is, the fiduciary label 
and concept has mixed two immiscible legal ideas, but we keep shaking the 
bottle in the hope that there is a theoretical way of making a compound. In 
part we continue to shake the bottle because we operate without attention to 
the historical precursors of these ideas.  
Part I of the article explores the distinctive legal ideas that are contained 
with the conception of the fiduciary in U.S. fiduciary and corporate law. 
The first, which reflects the traditional understanding of fiduciary relations, 
we label the “power/undertaking model” of fiduciary relations. The second, 
sourced in the doctrine of undue influence, is labelled the “influence 
conception” of fiduciary relations.  
A. Power and Undertaking 
1. The Source of Fiduciary Obligation 
In the traditional approach to fiduciary relations a person—agent, 
director, trustee, guardian—agrees to perform a representative function for 
or on behalf of another person—principal, corporation, beneficiary, child—
and that person is empowered to perform that undertaken function. 
Fiduciary obligation regulates the use of the power in the performance of 
the undertaking; ensuring that it is used as it was agreed and intended to be 
 
14. Id. at 1402–03. 
15. Lionel Smith, Contract, Consent, and Fiduciary Relationships, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND 
FIDUCIARY LAW 117, 137 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016) (“People don’t usually acquire 
powers unless they accept to do so, and this is why it is usually the case that a fiduciary has in some 
sense agreed, accepted, or undertaken to act.”); Shepherd, supra note 11, at 96 (“A fiduciary relationship 
exists whenever a person acquires a power of any type on condition that he also receive with it a duty to 
utilize that power in the best interests of another . . . ”) (emphasis added); Frankel, supra note 11, at 












used. The empowerment of the fiduciary involves the transfer of legal power 
or authority to legally act for or on behalf another in relation to the assets or 
rights of the other—to enable an agent to bind a principal, or the board of 
directors to make a decision for the company, or a guardian to decide where 
a child goes to school. Accordingly, in this conception a fiduciary relation 
does not arise when someone can merely act in ways that can affect others 
beneficially or detrimentally, but only where they have been legally 
empowered to act in ways that can alter another person’s rights and 
obligations, or the assets in relation to which they have rights and 
obligations. 
This conception flowed directly from early English judgments into U.S. 
law. In the House of Lords in York Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie in 1795, later 
referred to by the New York Court of Appeals in Gardner v. Ogden16 as “the 
great case,” a solicitor charged with the sale of an insolvent’s assets was 
prevented from buying those assets because: 
He that is entrusted with the interests of others, cannot be allowed to 
make the business an object of interest to himself; because from the 
frailty of nature, one who has the power, will be too readily seized 
with the inclination to use the opportunity for serving his own interest 
at the expense of those for whom he is entrusted.17  
As Lord Eldon observed seven years later in Ex parte Lacey, “A trustee, 
who is entrusted to sell and manage for others, undertakes in the same 
moment, in which he becomes a trustee, not to manage for the benefit and 
advantage of himself.” 18  Note here that the notion of “entrustment” 
encapsulates both the act of trusting or being trusted and empowerment to 
act on behalf of another—“to confer a trust on.”19  
This self-dealing rule was adopted in and affirmed by multiple U.S. cases 
in the nineteenth century. For example, in 1816 in Davoue v. Fanning,20 the 
New York Chancery court extended the rule to a trustee empowered with a 
“power to sell . . . to raise money for the legacies” who used the power to 
sell the property to his wife. Chancellor Kent observed that “if a trustee, 
acting for others, sells an estate, and becomes himself interested in the 
purchase, the cestui que trust is entitled . . . [to] set aside that purchase.”21 
 
16. 22 N.Y. 327, 347 (1860). 
17. (1795) 3 Eng. Rep. 432, 446 (emphasis added). Although commonly cited, this position is 
actually the position as stated by counsel.  
18. (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1228, 1228; 6 Ves. 625, 626. 
19. Entrust, MERRIAM WEBSTER, (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intrust [h 
ttps://perma.cc/LMW7-5EFW] (defining “entrust” and “intrust”). 
20. 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 254, 256 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). Davoue is a renowned case that has generated 
nearly 400 citations.  
21. Id. at 257. 











Accordingly, the transaction with his wife could not stand as “exercising the 
general powers of his trust for the benefit of his wife, was peculiarly 
calculated to touch and awaken the suggestions of self-interest.” 22 
Commenting on Kent’s work in Davoue, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Michoud v. Girod observed in 1846 that: 
[I]t is not too much to say, that [Davoue] has secured the triumph of 
the rule over all qualifications and relaxations of it in the United 
States, to the same extent that had been achieved for it in England by 
that great chancellor, Lord Eldon.23 
Central to this conception of fiduciary relations was that when a person was 
entrusted or “clothed with power” 24  over the assets or rights of others 
fiduciary obligation regulated and controlled the exercise of that power and 
ensured that it would be exercised to further the “beneficiary’s” interests. 
Necessarily, therefore, if there was no such transferred power there was 
nothing in relation to which a fiduciary obligation could act. Consider, for 
example, Rogers v. Rogers where the New York Chancery Court in 1825 
refused to apply the self-dealing rule to an executor who was not 
“empowered by the will, to sell the real estate . . . [and] had no control over 
the real estate.”25 The Chancery Court noted: 
It is only where the purchaser stands in the character of trustee, that 
his purchase is declared void. This character is the reason of the rule; 
and when the reason does not apply, the rule fails.26 
Consider also Gay v. Gay,27 an 1862 Massachusetts Supreme Court case, 
where, as the administrator of an estate was not “clothed with any power” 
to purchase a property on behalf of the estate, she was free to purchase it for 
herself. 28 And similarly, it followed that if a pre-existing power over assets 
was removed by actions beyond the control of the fiduciary then there was 
no longer a power for fiduciary obligation to control and no fiduciary 
relation. Accordingly, where as a result of the enforcement of a debt a 
 
22. Id. at 256–57. 
23. 45 U.S. 503, 556 (1846). 
24. See, for example, Bruck v. Broesigks, 18 Iowa 393, 395 (1865) in which state municipal 
corporations were deemed to have a relationship of “a fiduciary nature” with the state that “clothed 
[them] with power to assess and collect a tax for [the] State . . . .” (emphasis added). See also Hoffman 
Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 16 Md. 456, 464 (1860) (“Whether Sherman is to be 
regarded as trustee, in a technical sense, it is not important to determine. It is enough to know that he 
was acting for others; that he was clothed with powers which imposed upon him the duty to sell for the 
benefit of the stockholders of the company.”) (emphasis added). 
25. 1 Hopk. Ch. 515, 517 (N.Y. Ch. 1825). 
26. Id. (emphasis added). 
27. 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 181 (1862). 












fiduciary lost control over an asset, courts allowed the fiduciary to purchase 
it in a public auction in which the fiduciary played no role. For example, in 
Fisk v. Sarber the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1843 held that, although 
trustees would normally be restrained by fiduciary law from purchasing 
trust assets: 
[I]t being taken out of his possession, as it were, and certainly out of 
his power . . . and placed in the hands of the officer of the law, to 
whom full power is given to sell and dispose of the same, it is 
perfectly manifest that he thereby becomes devested of his 
trusteeship in regard to it; that all his power and control over it cease; 
so that he has no duty whatever to perform in respect to it in the 
slightest degree incompatible with his buying at the lowest price for 
which it may be obtained . . . .29 
This idea that fiduciary obligation ensured that the exercise of power was 
not infected by personal interest swiftly found its way into several of the 
leading nineteenth-century corporate-fiduciary cases. Consider, for 
example, Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman,30 a New York corporate 
self-dealing case where, drawing on Michoud v. Girod, Davoue v. Fanning, 
and a range of leading cases from “Hardwicke, Thurlow, Loughborough, 
Eldon, Cranworth, Story and Kent,”31 the court unequivocally extended the 
self-dealing rule to corporate directors who had “duties to discharge of a 
fiduciary nature.”32 Consider also, Wardell v. Railroad Co., where the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that: 
Those directors, constituting the executive committee of the board, 
were clothed with power to manage the affairs of the company for the 
benefit of its stockholders and creditors. Their character as agents 
forbade the exercise of their powers for their own personal ends 
against the interest of the company. They were thereby precluded 
from deriving any advantage from contracts, made by their authority 
as directors, except through the company for which they acted. Their 
position was one of great trust, and to engage in any matter for their 
personal advantage inconsistent with it was to violate their duty and 
to commit a fraud upon the company.  
 
29. 6 Watts & Serg. 18, 23 (Pa. 1843) (emphasis added). Fisk v. Sarber is followed in several 
Pennsylvania cases thereafter. See, e.g., In re Kelley’s Estate, 146 A. 260 (Pa. 1929); Ellis v. Ellis, 203 
A.2d 547 (Pa. 1964). But where the assets were sold at auction which the fiduciary brought about or 
controlled—where he exercised power to make it happen—the self-dealing prohibition would continue 
to apply. See MacDougall v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 108 A. 608, 609 (Pa. 1919) (applying where sale was 
“brought about or in any manner controlled by him”). 
30. 30 Barb. 553 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1859). 
31. Id. at 579. 
32. Id. at 571. 











 . . . Directors of corporations, and all persons who stand in a 
fiduciary relation to other parties, and are clothed with power to act 
for them, are subject to this rule; they are not permitted to occupy a 
position which will conflict with the interest of parties they represent 
and are bound to protect.33 
Power and its control were foregrounded in these early corporate and non-
corporate fiduciary cases. As noted above, it is similarly central to several 
modern theories of fiduciary relations.34 But empowerment is only one of 
two component parts of the fiduciary compact. The flipside of the 
entrustment and transfer of power to a person is the agreement of that person 
to exercise the power for the purposes for which it is conferred. By the mid-
nineteenth century in both the United Kingdom and the United States the 
early cases’ self-dealing prohibition on “making business” or “managing” 
for oneself came to be articulated as a prohibition on placing the fiduciary’s 
duty in conflict with his personal interest. This “duty” with which fiduciary 
law prevented the personal interest from conflicting was the agreement or 
the undertaking to act in a particular way in relation to the transferred power 
and authority—only where the performance of the undertaking could 
conflict with personal interest did fiduciary restraint bite. Note in this regard 
Lord Eldon’s words quoted above that served as the foundation of the no-
conflict rule in the United Kingdom and the United States: he “undertakes 
in the same moment, in which he becomes a trustee, not to manage [not to 
perform the undertaking or duty to manage] for the benefit and advantage 
of himself.” 35  In Grover v. Hugell, 36  the first English case to convert 
Eldon’s no-advantage rule into the no-conflict rule, a rector was tasked 
(undertook/had a duty) to sell a property on behalf of his curate, which he 
purchased himself. The Master of the Rolls, John Leach, observed that: 
The general rule in equity is, that a man cannot place himself in a 
situation in which his interest conflict with his duty. The duty [what 
he agreed or undertook to do] of the rector was, to obtain the best 
possible price for the land sold; and his interest as purchaser was, to 
pay the least possible price for it.37  
U.S. cases articulated the rule as a prohibition on conflict between 
undertaken duty and personal interest earlier than the UK cases. For 
Chancellor Kent in Davoue v. Fanning, for example, the trustee’s sale to his 
wife was prohibited because “[h]is interest here interfered with his duty”: a 
 
33. 103 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1880) (emphasis added). 
34. See supra notes 9–15. 
35. Ex parte Lacey (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1228, 1228; 6 Ves. 625, 626. 
36. (1827) 38 Eng. Rep. 636; 3 Russ. 428.  












“duty of the [trustee] executor” to “sell [property] to raise money for the 
legacies.”38  
In this traditional understanding of fiduciary relations, although 
undertaking is often implicit and backgrounded, demarcating its nature and 
extent is necessarily central to determining the scope of application of 
fiduciary obligation. Determining, for example, the nature of the directorial 
role a director has agreed to perform would demarcate the extent to which 
a director could and could not act in his personal interests. In this regard 
consider, for example, the law of corporate opportunities. In several of the 
foundational corporate opportunity cases, the directorial role was only 
understood to involve a duty to act to acquire an opportunity where the 
corporation had a property-like expectancy in the opportunity. When it did 
not have one, no duty was owed, and, therefore, no conflict of duty and 
interest arose which could prevent the director taking the asset in his 
personal capacity.39 Accordingly, in the nucleus of the original idea of a 
fiduciary relationship was a compound of undertaking/agreement/consent 
to act in a particular way and the legal empowerment to do so; in the absence 
of either component part there would be no fiduciary relationship or 
obligation.40 
2. The Structure of Fiduciary Duties 
In this power/undertaking understanding of fiduciary relations, defining 
the nature of a fiduciary relation or labelling a person a “fiduciary” is in 
important respects beside the point. This is because through this 
understanding the terms fiduciary and fiduciary duty merely have a 
categorization and labelling function. The trustee, agent, or director in this 
conception of a fiduciary relation does not owe obligations because she is a 
fiduciary. Rather, the obligations flow from the agent’s empowerment and 
 
38. Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 255–56 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); see also Michoud v. Girod, 
45 U.S. 503, 559 (1846) (“The rule as expressed embraces every relation in which there may arise a 
conflict between the duty [owed] . . . and his own individual interest.”). 
39. See, e.g., Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 28 So. 199 (Ala. 1900); De Bardeleben v. 
Bessemer Land & Improvement Co., 37 So. 511 (Ala. 1904); Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 100 P. 784 (Ariz. 
1909). 
40. This approach continues to dominate U.K. and commonwealth approaches to fiduciary 
relations today. As the English High Court in Halton Int’l Inc. v. Guernroy Ltd. observed, “A critical 
and usually determinative feature of any fiduciary relationship is the agreement of the fiduciary to act 
in the interests of the principal in the exercise of the power which is granted or in relation to the 
principal's property or business affairs.” [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1968 [148] (emphasis added). But see 
Lehtimäki v. Cooper [2020] UKSC 33 [42]–[51] (suggesting a change of direction). The High Court of 
Australia’s judgment in Hosp Prods Ltd v US Surgical Corp, provided a similar, globally influential, 
summary of fiduciary relations: “The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary 
undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a 
power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense.” 
(1984) 156 CLR 41, 96–97 (emphasis added). 











undertaking to perform the role: she must use the transferred power as she 
agreed to in accordance with the purposes for which it was transferred. That 
is, through the lens of this traditional approach, duties—including the duty 
to exercise powers in good faith, the no conflict rule and the obligation of 
care—can all be understood as endogenous to the agreement and 
empowerment to act. Structurally, they are not imposed by law and 
fashioned by courts to regulate the scope for abuse of power; rather, they 
are recognised and enforced by courts and reflect what the fiduciary agreed 
to do with the transferred authority: to use it as was agreed for another’s 
benefit. Accordingly, one might say, as commenters and judges have, that 
it is because she owes such duties that she is a fiduciary. 41  But this 
commonly quoted claim does not dig deeply enough—she owes such duties 
because that it is what she undertook/agreed to do and was empowered to 
do.  
The early cases and commentary evidence this endogenous 
understanding of duties. For Eldon, the no-conflict rule was immanent 
within the undertaking to manage the sale of the bankrupt’s property. He 
observed, as we noted above, a trustee, agent, or an assignee in bankruptcy 
“undertakes in the same moment, in which he becomes a trustee, not to 
manage”—that is to perform the undertaking using the powers to manage 
transferred to him—“for the benefit and advantage of himself.”42 In relation 
to the duty of care, Lord Holt in the foundational bailment case of Coggs v 
Barnard held that “the undertaking obliges the undertaker to a diligent 
management.”43 Consider also in this regard, Victor Morawetz’s—former 
Cravath partner and leading nineteenth-century corporate textbook writer—
account of the director as agent-fiduciary:  
Whenever an agent is invested with authority to use any discretion in 
the exercise of the powers conferred upon him, it is an implied 
condition that this discretion shall be used in good faith for the benefit 
of the principal, and in accordance with the true purpose of the 
agent’s appointment. To this extent, every agency which is not a 
 
41. P.D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 2 (1977). Finn states that “he is not subject to fiduciary 
obligations because he is a fiduciary; it is because he is subject to them that he is a fiduciary,” which has 
been widely quoted following its reference in Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698, 
712. 
42. Ex parte Lacey (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1228, 1228; 6 Ves. 625, 626. In Ex parte Bennett (1805) 
32 Eng. Rep. 893, 897; 10 Ves. 381, 394, three years later, he observed that “the ground” of/the “reason” 
for this no-advantage rule was that, as a bankruptcy commissioner, he would not be able to perform his 
undertaking: to exercise the delegated power “to sell to the best advantage.” 
43. Coggs v. Barnard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 113; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 919 (QB) (emphasis 
added). On the influence of Coggs and bailment care standards on the directorial duty of case, see 












purely ministerial one involves a fiduciary relation between the 
parties.  
. . . . 
The directors or trustees of a corporation, in accepting their 
appointment to office, impliedly undertake to give the company the 
benefit of their best care and judgment . . . .44 
As Morawetz explains, the core duties are inherent in the undertaking and 
empowerment—it is an “implied condition” of the “invest[ing] [of] 
authority” that the powers are used in “good faith” for the benefit of the 
transferor and for the purposes the empowerment; likewise, obligations of 
care and judgment review standards are “implicit” in the directorial 
undertaking.45 For Morawetz, as they were for Eldon and Holt, these duties 
are the endogenous product of agreeing to perform and being empowered to 
perform the role. 
Upon these endogenous and “implied obligations” modern corporate 
fiduciary obligations have been built. As I have argued elsewhere,46 the 
business judgment rule is rooted in the implied condition “that this 
discretion shall be used in good faith for the benefit of the principal, and in 
accordance with the true purpose of the agent’s appointment.”47 Fairness 
review, particularly fairness in relation to price, is the product of U.S. courts 
exploring the remedial consequences of breaching the obligation to avoid a 
conflict between undertaken duty and personal interest.48 And whilst today 
fairness review and duties of good faith are enveloped in an overarching 
general duty of loyalty, it is important to note that within this 
power/undertaking understanding of fiduciary relations, the obligations 
owed by a fiduciary are not derived from an overarching loyalty obligation 
which applies to individuals who are deemed to be fiduciaries. Instead the 
undertaking and empowerment invoke a set of obligations designed to 
ensure the performance of the role/undertaking. Of course, all such duties 
are concerned with the loyal exercise of power because the relationship is 
based on the agreement to act on behalf of another. But in this legal idea 
there is no fiduciary duty of loyalty that serves as a source of other-regarding 
obligations as we meet a future of unforeseen fiduciary circumstance.  
 
44. MORAWETZ, supra note 1, at 483. 
45. Id. 
46. KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 68–92. 
47. MORAWETZ, supra note 1, at 483. 
48. See supra note 4 and infra notes 228–237. 











3. To Whom is the Duty Owed: Stockholders “Convening” the 
Corporation 
Through this power/undertaking understanding of fiduciary relations, 
fiduciary duties are owed to and enforceable by the person (legal or real) 
who the fiduciary undertakes to act for or on behalf of, which will either be 
the person who transfers power to the fiduciary or another person who the 
transferee instructs the fiduciary to act for or on behalf of. In the United 
States, directors are appointed by the shareholder meeting which is an organ 
of the corporation, although the state through the corporate statute, not the 
shareholder meeting, empowers the directors to act for the corporation. For 
Delaware today the directors are empowered to manage the “business and 
affairs of [the] corporation,” 49  just as in New Jersey’s foundational 
corporate statute of 1896 “the business of every corporation shall be 
managed by its directors . . . .” 50  Accordingly, through the 
power/undertaking lens, a director’s fiduciary duties are necessarily owed 
only to the corporation.  
However, in the United States it is common for courts to observe that a 
directors’ fiduciary duties are owed both to the corporation and the 
shareholders. Less commonly, but not infrequently, courts observe that a 
director’s fiduciary duties are owed to the shareholders alone. As the 
California Appeals Court in Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co. 
in 1952 observed:  
[Directors] owe a duty to all stockholders, including the minority 
stockholders, and must administer their duties for the common 
benefit. The concept that a corporation is an entity cannot operate so 
as to lessen the duties owed to all of the stockholders.51  
This is a position that has deep roots in corporate law in the United States, 
and it is a position that seems to cast doubt on the power/undertaking 
framework set out in this Part I. Accordingly, these statements need to be 
carefully parsed.52 In 1831 in Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co. of New York, 
for example, the Vice Chancellor observed that: 
But when a corporation aggregate is formed, and the persons 
composing it—either in virtue of their compact or by the express 
terms of the charter—place the management and control of its affairs 
in the hands of a select few, so that life and animation may be given 
 
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(a) (2020). 
50. See General Corporation Act, 1896 N.J. Laws 281 § 12. 
51. 241 P.2d 66, 74 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
52. See generally Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD 












to the body, then such directors become the agents and trustees of the 
corporators and a relation is created, not between the stockholders 
and the body corporate, but between the stockholders and those 
directors who, in their character of trustees, become accountable for 
any wilful dereliction of duty or violation of the trust reposed in them. 
I see no objection to the exercise of an equity power over such 
persons in the same manner as it would be exercised over any other 
trustees.53 
For the Vice Chancellor, consistent with the power/undertaking conception 
of fiduciary relations, a trusteeship relationship between the directors and 
shareholders is created as a result of the persons who “compos[e]” the 
company—the corporators—empowering the persons who have agreed to 
act as directors (“plac[ing] the management and control” in their hands).54 
However, although the Vice Chancellor’s words above suggest a bilateral 
(director-stockholder) and direct (to the stockholder) nature of this 
trusteeship, in fact he understood that these obligations fell within the 
corporate-entity umbrella. He observed: 
The [corporation] is merely the creature of the law, a political not a 
natural body, made up of the compact entered into by the 
stockholders, each of whom becomes a corporator identified with and 
forming a constituent part of the corporate body: and therefore, when 
we speak of stockholders and the incorporated company of which they 
are the components, we refer to one and the same collection of 
persons.55 
As the corporators and the stockholders “compos[e]” the corporation and 
were a “constituent part of the corporate body,” a relationship of trusteeship 
between directors and stockholders was a relationship of trusteeship 
between directors and stockholders as a component part of the corporate 
body.56 Echoing this position, Angell and Ames, authors of the nineteenth 
century’s leading corporate law text, observed that “stockholders compose 
the company.”57 Accordingly, for them, relying on Verplanck, it followed 
clearly that any breach of such “trusteeship” duty could only be enforced by 
the corporation or derivatively on its behalf where the corporation was 
incapable of prosecuting the action.58  
 
53. 1 Edw. Ch. 84, 87–88 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). 
54. Id. at 87. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
751 (7th ed. 1861). 
58. Id. at 310. 











Verplanck is the foundation for the more influential decision of the New 
York Supreme Court in Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman,59 where 
the court affirmed this position in fiduciary rather than trusteeship terms. 
Citing Verplanck, as well as authorities and commentary that relied on 
Verplanck, the court observed that: 
There can be no question . . . at the present time, that a director of a 
corporation is the agent or trustee of the stockholders and as such 
has duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature, towards his principal, 
and is subject to the obligations and disabilities incidental to that 
relation.60 
But again as in Verplanck, the court understands “the stockholders” to be a 
constituent part of the body corporate and accordingly proceeded to quote 
the English case Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Brothers61 to the effect 
that “[a] corporate body can only act by agents, and it is, of course, the duty 
of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation 
whose affairs they are conducting,”62 as well as to (naturally) misquote the 
above quotation from Verplanck to the effect that “such directors become 
the agents and trustees of the corporation.”63 For the court in Cumberland, 
a director owed fiduciary duties to the corporation64 but more specifically 
to the shareholder body of the corporation, which in their former capacity 
of corporators, formed the corporation. That is, in effect, a duty owed to the 
corporation to further the interests of the shareholder body/organ.  
The earliest Delaware case that addressed the issue in brief was a 
Delaware Court of Errors and Appeals decision in Todd v. The Diamond 
State Iron Company.65 Citing, inter alia, Cumberland, the court observed 
that: “the defendant . . . as secretary, officer and agent of the company, stood 
towards the company, its stockholders, and towards [the plaintiff] as a 
stockholder, in a fiduciary relation.”66 This is a position that, without the 
context of Verpanck and Cumberland, could be misread as providing for a 
direct duty towards the plaintiff stockholder. Subsequent early Delaware 
 
59. 30 Barb. 553 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1859). This is a case that attracts 146 State and Federal 
citations (including Coal Co. v. Sherman), but only three in Delaware: Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224 
(Del. Ch. 1921), Todd v. Diamond State Iron Co., 13 Del. (8 Houst.) 372 (1889), and Diamond State 
Iron Co. v Todd, 14 A. 27 (Del. Ch. 1888). 
60. Cumberland Coal Co., 30 Barb. at 571 (emphasis added). 
61. [1854] All ER Rep. 249, 252.  
62. Cumberland Coal Co., 30 Barb. at 572 (quoting Aberdeen Rwy. Co. v. Blaikie Bros., [1854] 
All ER Rep. 249, 252). 
63. Cumberland Coal. Co., 30 Barb. at 572 (emphasis added). 
64. MORAWETZ, supra note 1, at 483 (citing Cumberland, 30 Barb. at 559–77) (observing that 
“[t]he relation between the directors of a corporation and the company itself is . . . in many respects, a 
fiduciary or trust relation”). 
65. 13 Del. (8 Houst.) 372 (1889). 












law cases addressing this issue clarified the corporate nature of a fiduciary 
obligation owed to the corporation and the stockholders, as set forth in the 
foundational cases. In Du Pont v. Du Pont the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Delaware observed that: 
The duties of a director or other officer of a corporation in 
transactions where he is representing his company are governed by 
well-established and familiar rules of equity. A director of a 
corporation may freely purchase its stock, and occupies no relation 
of trust to an individual stockholder . . . . [B]ut to the corporation, the 
whole body of stockholders, he stands in a fiduciary relation which 
requires him to exercise the utmost good faith in managing the 
business affairs of the company with a view to promote, not his own 
interests, but the common interests . . . .67 
The position in Du Pont was described by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
its first self-dealing case, Lofland v. Cahall,68 as “well stated” and reflects 
the modern position. As Vice Chancellor Laster explained recently in In re 
Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation: 
Judicial opinions therefore often refer to directors owing fiduciary 
duties “to the corporation and its shareholders” . . . . This formulation 
captures the foundational relationship in which directors owe duties 
to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the entity's residual 
claimants. Nevertheless, “stockholders' best interest must always, 
within legal limits, be the end. Other constituencies may be 
considered only instrumentally to advance that end.”69  
Moreover, statements about duties owed to the stockholders must be read 
not only with the corporate context provided by these cases but also within 
the context of the nature of the actions brought to enforce the director’s 
fiduciary duties, which through the power/undertaking lens must be brought 
either by the corporation or derivatively on behalf of the corporate right-
holder/duty-recipient and not directly in the individual name of a right-
holding shareholder.70 Such a shareholder has no cause of action because 
although her financial interests may have been detrimentally affected by the 
breach of duty owed to the corporation, such detriment does not infringe 
any fiduciary duty actually owed to her. In this regard note that Verplanck 
was an early derivative action with the corporation as nominal defendant, 
and in Cumberland the action was brought by the corporation. 
 
67. 242 F. 98, 136 (D. Del. 1917) (emphasis added). 
68. 118 A. 1, 7 (Del 1922).  
69. 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (internal citations omitted). 
70. See supra notes 49–50. 











B. Influence and Superiority: The Fiduciary as “Economic Agent” 
1. The Doctrines of Undue Influence and Fair Dealing 
A second conception of the fiduciary in U.S. fiduciary law arises out of 
the law’s regulation of contractual relations where the pre-existing 
relationship between two contracting parties has the potential to affect the 
formation of the intention and the volition of one of the contracting parties.71 
Here we see the intersection of what is often presented as two equitable 
doctrines which in fact address a singular legal idea: the fiduciary influence 
or fair dealing standard and the undue influence doctrine.72 The former, 
which should be seen as an outcrop of the latter, is the product of cases in 
which a person, who was a fiduciary in accordance with the 
power/undertaking conception of fiduciary outlined above, entered into a 
transaction with his charge (principal/beneficiary/corporation). The 
foundation of the rule is found in Gibson v. Jeyes73 where an attorney had 
acted as an agent in the sale of property for the deceased plaintiff (i.e., an 
empowered fiduciary) and then subsequently sold her an annuity. Lord 
Eldon observed that:  
A trustee also may deal with his Cestuy que trust; but the relation 
must be in some way dissolved: or, if not, the parties must be put so 
much at arm’s length, that they agree to take the characters of 
purchaser and vendor; and you must examine, whether all the duties 
of those characters have been performed. . . .  
. . . [H]e, who bargains in a matter of advantage with a person placing 
confidence in him is bound to shew, that a reasonable use has been 
made of that confidence; a rule applying to trustees, attorneys, or 
anyone else.74 
Although Gibson v Jeyes provides the foundation of the fiduciary influence 
rule which requires fair dealing between a trustee and a beneficiary or agent 
and principal, for Lord Eldon this “great rule” 75  instantiated a broader 
position: “that where one person takes an unfair advantage of another, it is 
the peculiar province of equity to give relief.” 76  That is, the fiduciary 
influence standard is a clear application of a broader equitable rule which 
provides that where the relationship between two contracting parties excites 
 
71. Undue influence applies not only to contract but to other areas of legal life, most importantly 
in relation to testamentary dispositions.  
72. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 237–41. 
73. (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 1044. 
74. Id. at 1049–50 (emphasis added).  
75. Id. at 1050. 












suspicion about the way in which the intention to enter contractual relations 
on the part of one of the parties was formed, equity will require evidence of 
fair dealing connected primarily to process but also to price.77 
Central to this legal idea is determining what types of relationship—
which provide for the possibility of influence and suggestion—excite 
suspicion as to voluntariness. As Gibson and its progeny78  make clear, 
where one of the parties is a fiduciary—in the undertaking/empowerment 
sense of the term—then presumptively79 this rule applies. But as Lord Eldon 
implied in Gibson (“applying to . . . any one else”80) and made clear in his 
subsequent jurisprudence, there are other non-fiduciary relationships where 
there are bonds of trust and confidence where the rule applies: including, 
but not limited to, advisor/attorney and client, husband and wife, member 
of a congregation and priest.81 Indeed, Lord Eldon applied a very similar 
rule six years after Gibson v. Jeyes in Huguenin v. Baseley,82 in relation to 
invalidation of a gift from the plaintiff to a clergyman, where there was no 
fiduciary relationship. Huguenin is viewed in England and the United States 
as the foundation of the undue influence rule. Lord Eldon observed that: 
“The question is not whether she knew what she was doing, had done, or 
proposed do, but how the intention was produced . . . .”83 Huguenin and 
Gibson were rightly fused in the influential New York Court of Appeals 
case, Cowee v. Cornell84 where the court observed: 
Whenever, however, the relations between the contracting parties 
appear to be of such a character as to render it certain that they do not 
 
77. On fair price, see Thomson v. Eastwood (1877) 2 App. Cas. 215, 236; Marquis of Clanricarde 
v. Henning (1861) 54 Eng. Rep. 855, 859 (referring also to “full value”). More recently, see Tito v. 
Wardell [1977] Ch 106 at 225, where VC Megarry observed that the fair dealing rule required that “the 
beneficiary was fully informed and received fair value.” Many of the fair dealing and undue influence 
cases do not, however, engage with price, leading some commentators to view fair price as a subordinate 
consideration to fair process. See CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 106–108. Conaglen is correct that price 
should be seen as one factor that may be indicative of whether influence has affected volition. It may, 
depending on the facts of each case, not be relevant where process factors clearly indicate that volition 
was or was not affected. 
78. Hunter v. Atkins (1834) 47 Eng. Rep. 166; Thompson v. Eastwood (1877) 2 App. Cas. 215. 
79. Although not necessarily as it depends on the scope to exercise influence. See Smith v. Kay 
(1859) 11 Eng. Rep. 299, 308 (“[I]f the principle is examined, it will be found most frequently applied 
[to fiduciaries] for the simple reason that the fiduciary relation gives a power of influence: but I could 
suggest fifty cases of fiduciary relation where the principle will not apply at all . . . [where the fiduciary 
has] no influence over him.”) (Lord Cranworth). 
80. 31 Eng. Rep. at 1050. 
81. 11 Eng. Rep. at 308 (“Now what does ‘any one else’ mean? It is contended that it applies 
only to persons who stand in a fiduciary relation. I believe, if the principle is examined, it will be most 
frequently applied in such cases . . . .”). On the relations which “infer the probability of such undue 
influence,” see Houghton v Houghton (1852) 51 Eng. Rep. 545, 554. 
82. (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 526. 
83. Id. at 536. 
84. 75 N.Y. 91, 95 (1878) (Hand, J.) (citing Huguinen and other English cases relying on Gibson 
and Huguinen). 











deal on terms of equality but that either on the one side from superior 
knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or from 
overmastering influence, or on the other from weakness, dependence, 
or trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage in a transaction is 
rendered probable, there the burden is shifted, the transaction is 
presumed void, and it is incumbent upon the stronger party to show 
affirmatively that no deception was practiced, no undue influence 
was used, and that all was fair, open, voluntary and well understood. 
This doctrine is well settled. . . . 
 The principle referred to it must be remembered is distinct from 
that absolutely forbidding a purchase by a trustee or agent for his own 
benefit of the subject of a trust, and charging it when so purchased 
with the trust. That amounts to an incapacity in the fiduciary to 
purchase of himself. He cannot act for himself at all however fairly 
or innocently in any dealing as to which he has duties as trustee or 
agent. The reason of this rule is subjective. It removes from the 
trustee, with the power, all temptation to commit any breach of trust 
for his own benefit. But the principle with which we are now 
concerned does not absolutely forbid the dealing, but it presumes it 
unfair and fraudulent unless the contrary is affirmatively shown.85 
Cowee and its progeny makes it clear that a fiduciary relationship is not 
required for the application of the rule, rather, merely a relationship between 
the contracting parties that could affect the voluntariness of the 
transaction—it refers to either a “fiduciary relation” or “superior 
knowledge” derived from “overmastering influence.”86 In the 1891 New 
Jersey case of Mott v. Mott,87 drawing on Cowee, Gibson, and Huguenin,88 
in a statement of the position that is still used today in New Jersey,89 the 
court observed that “[t]he principle applies, and the rule of evidence is 
enforced, in all transactions between persons occupying relations, whether 
 
85. Id. at 99–100 (emphasis added). For an earlier New York broader articulation of the principle 
set forth in Gibson v. Jeyes, the Chancellor in Howell v. Ransom, 11 Paige Ch. 538, 540–41 (N.Y. Ch. 
1845) cites Gibson for the proposition that “[t]he attorney, therefore, can never sustain a purchase of this 
kind, without showing that he communicated to his clients everything which was necessary to enable 
them to form a correct judgment of the actual value of the subject of the purchase, and as to the propriety 
of selling at the price offered. And his neglect to ascertain the true state of the facts himself will not 
sustain his purchase.”  
86. Cowee, 75 N.Y. at 99–100. See also Fisher v. Bishop, 15 N.E. 331, 332 (N.Y. 1888), where 
the New York Court of Appeals, quoting Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence § 951, observed: “Where an 
antecedent fiduciary relation exists, a court of equity will presume confidence placed and influence 
exerted. Where there is no such fiduciary relation, the confidence and influence must be proved by 
satisfactory extrinsic evidence.” For earlier cases articulating this position, see McCormick v. Malin, 5 
Blackf. 509, 523 (Ind. 1841); Graham v. Little, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 152, 164 (1857). 
87. 22 A. 997 (N.J. Ch. 1891). 
88. Id. at 999–1000, 1002. 












legal, natural, or conventional in their origin, in which confidence is 
naturally inspired, is presumed, or in fact reasonable exists.”90 
2. Influence and Fiduciary Relations 
This fiduciary influence/undue influence standard applies in relation to 
a transaction between parties where the pre-existing relationship between 
the parties is such that the voluntariness of the transaction and its terms are 
brought into question and requires evidence of fair dealing from the 
“superior” party in order to be able to enforce the transaction. In this 
doctrine, the superior party is not under any general obligation or duty to 
act in the interest of the weaker party but must demonstrate only that she 
has not abused her position and capacity to influence the weaker person in 
entering into a contract with her.91  That is, the doctrine only provides 
transaction-specific protection. And, as noted, anyone who is, separately, in 
a (power/undertaking) fiduciary capacity with that person is presumed to be 
in such a relationship of influence. But it does not follow therefrom that 
anyone who is subject to this transaction specific regulation—because of 
their relationship with the other party—is a fiduciary.92 If we elected to call 
such persons “fiduciaries” we would be using the concept in a completely 
different way to the way in which it is used in the power/undertaking 
relationships considered above—the former categorizes and labels legal 
obligations arising from a delegation of power and the undertaking to use 
the power in a particular way; the latter regulates potential influence by a 
person who exercises no delegated power in the context of a specific 
transaction.93 To craft a conception of “fiduciary” in this way would be to 
craft a conception of “fiduciary” that has no connection to empowerment or 
undertaking to act on another’s behalf: it would suggest that you are a 
fiduciary if you are merely in a position to affect another’s interests, similar 
to the economic (not the legal) idea of an agent and principal.94 Although 
clearly, given the ubiquity of such influence-effects, the attribution of this 
 
90. Mott, 22 A. at 999. 
91. See supra note 85.  
92. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 825 n.100 (noting confusion between fiduciary relations and 
confidence and the fact that they respond to different problems).  
93. The point here is not that it is inappropriate to use the concept of fiduciary in relation to the 
influence doctrine. Indeed, it might seem apposite given “that the word ‘fiduciary’ derives from the Latin 
fiducia, which means trust or confidence.” Edelman, supra note 12, at 306. There is no is inherent legal 
idea contained in the word fiduciary. The point is that to use it in relation to both the power/undertaking 
conception and the undue influence conception is to use it in relation to two independent legal ideas that 
have very different sources and logics in relation to the concept of duty. 
94. See generally REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY 
HANSMANN, GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA, MARIANA PARGENDLER, WOLF_GEORG 
RINGE, & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH (3d ed. 2017) on the economic agency problem. 











type of fiduciary label is likely to require a significant potential influence 
(as the New York Court of Appeals in Cowee put it, an “overmastering 
influence”).95 Note also, that in such a conception, necessarily the recipient 
of the duty (and therefore the person entitled to enforce the duty) would be 
the person who may be detrimentally affected by the actions of such a 
“fiduciary.” 
Moreover, labelling persons who fall within the ambit of the 
transactional undue influence rule “fiduciaries” not only transforms the idea 
of the fiduciary, it also threatens96 to transform the structure of fiduciary 
duties. Doing so makes available a legal structure whereby obligations 
relating to fair process and fair price are owed to the recipient of the duties 
because the superior party is deemed to be a “fiduciary” not simply because 
that person is in a position to affect the volition of the counterparty in the 
context of a transaction with that person. This structure in turn readily makes 
available the idea that once categorized as this type of “fiduciary” a set of 
other-regarding/loyalty obligations are owed by this fiduciary of which the 
fair dealing rules are merely one component part. This in turn generates a 
risk of duty overspill into this influence-loyalty obligation from the 
power/undertaking conception. That is, the shared nomenclature encourages 
analogical learning between two wholly distinct legal phenomena.  
In this second influence-conception of the fiduciary any such identified 
duties operate in a structurally different way than in the power/undertaking 
conception. In the power/undertaking conception, loyalty obligations—to 
exercise power in good faith to further the delegated purpose and to avoid 
conflicts of interest with the exercise of that power—serve the undertaking 
given to exercise the transferred power on behalf of or for another; that is, 
they are second order obligations which regulate, and are derived from,97 
the first order obligation to perform the undertaking. But in the influence 
conception of fiduciary relations there is no such undertaken duty to 
perform or transferred power around which the fiduciary loyalty duties 
orbit. Any claim, therefore, that (influence) fiduciaries are subject to similar 
loyalty obligations as power fiduciaries necessarily must find the source of 
obligation in the attribution of the label “fiduciary” itself. The attribution of 
the label “fiduciary” thereby becomes a source of obligation as opposed to 
a label for obligation sourced elsewhere (in undertaking and empowerment). 
 
95. Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 100 (1878). 
96. The point here that while the labelling of all such actors as fiduciaries threatens the legal 
developments outlined in the remainder of this paragraph, it does not follow that they occur. Courts 
could use the term fiduciary in influence contexts but restrictively apply it to transaction contexts only 
thereby using the term as a label for actors that are caught by the undue influence rule in a transactional 
context. See, e.g., Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 149 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (using the 
term fiduciary duty but applying the undue influence standard only).  












In this conception, it is not the case that you are a fiduciary because you owe 
fiduciary duties, rather you owe fiduciary duties because you are a 
fiduciary. And the duty of loyalty of such a fiduciary thereby becomes a 
first-order obligation, providing a deep well of unexplored obligation. 
3. The Infiltration of Fiduciary Influence 
Given these potential effects, early U.S. courts sensibly resisted98 this 
conflagration. For these courts the undue influence doctrine was applicable 
where “special, confidential, or fiduciary relations between all the parties” 
afforded the “means of taking undue advantage . . . .”99 Although courts 
would often refer to the application of the rule to “fiduciary and 
confidential” relations,100 in nineteenth-century U.S. law, these were not 
legal synonyms; a person was not a fiduciary merely because she was in a 
relation of confidence.101 Consider in this regard the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1909 decision in Strong v. Repide, 102  relating to a purchase of a 
stockholder’s shares by a director, controlling shareholder, and “general 
administrator.” For the Supreme Court there was no direct relationship of a 
“fiduciary nature” between the director and the stockholders. 103  But 
consistent with the broader application of the undue influence doctrine, by 
reason of “special facts”104 which, echoing Cowee, led to an “overwhelming 
influence”105 over the seller of the shares, the defendant owed a “duty”106 in 
relation to the sale transaction to “state the facts before making the 
purchase” and “to disclose to a shareholder the general knowledge which he 
may possess regarding the value of the shares of the company before he 
 
98. See, for example, Wood v. Rabe, 96 N.Y. 414 (1884) an undue influence case in relation to 
a mother’s influence over her son is which the court observed “[i]t was a transaction between parent and 
child, a relation which, if not fiduciary in the strict sense, was nevertheless one ordinarily involving the 
greatest confidence on one side, and the greatest influence on the other.” Id. at 426. 
99. See Wilson v. Watts, 9 Md. 356, 388 (1856) (emphasis added). 
100. Id. at 396. 
101. Id. at 388; see also Uhlich v. Muhlke, 61 Ill. 499, 534 (1871); Ranken v. Patton, 65 Mo. 378, 
388 (1877); Thompson v. Lee, 31 Ala. 292, 304 (1857); Miskey’s Appeal, 3 Pennyp. 408, 426–27 (Pa. 
1883). All of these cases base their holding on Gibson v. Jeyes, as well as, in several instances, Huguenin 
v. Baseley. 
102. 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (case appealed from the Supreme Court of the Philippines). 
103. Id. at 431; see id. (“It is here sought to make defendant responsible for his actions, not alone 
and simply in his character as a director, but because, in consideration of all the existing circumstances 
above detailed, it became the duty of the defendant, acting in good faith, to state the facts before making 
the purchase.”) (emphasis added). The Court also cites Board of Commissioners v. Reynolds, “where it 
was held . . . that no relationship of a fiduciary nature exists between a director and a shareholder in a 
business corporation.” Id. 
104. The “special facts” were the position of influence the defendant held as a director, controlling 
shareholder, and “administrator general.” Id. 
105. Id. at 433. 
106. Id. at 431. 











purchases any from a shareholder”107—a position rooted in cases which in 
turn were rooted in Gibson v Jeyes.108 It is worth emphasizing that for the 
Supreme Court when those “special facts” were present a fair dealing 
requirement (“duty”) was owed, but such special facts did not render the 
director a fiduciary in relation to the shareholder, and such a “duty” was not 
owed as a director but arose from the influence generated by the fact, inter 
alia, that he was a director.109 
However, later U.S. courts, including Delaware courts, were less careful 
with the concept of fiduciary in undue influence contexts and gradually 
adopted the influence conception as a fiduciary standard; first in non-
corporate but then in corporate contexts. Consider, for example, 
developments in the New York courts. In the 1901 New York Court of 
Appeals case of Doheny v. Lacy, the court destabilized the relationship 
between fiduciary and confidential by providing that only where a fiduciary 
relation exists was the undue influence rule applicable and implying that a 
fiduciary relationship arose where the law recognised that certain 
“confidential” and “unequal” relations created scope for dominance.110 For 
subsequent cases, following “the rule referred to in Doheny v. Lacy,” 
relations of influence were considered to have “created what the law regards 
as a fiduciary relation . . . .”111 In Von Au v. Magenheimer, another New 
York influence case relating to the purchase of shares by corporate officers, 
the court observed “[i]f their relation was not strictly of [a] fiduciary 
character . . . it was in a sense fiduciary . . . .”112 Some New York courts 
even cited Strong v. Repide as standing for this fiduciary designation.113  
A possible driver for this fusing of legal ideas in the concept of the 
fiduciary is an early tendency to refer to power/undertaking fiduciary 
 
107. Id.  
108. See e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 516 (1873) (citing Carpenter v. Danworth, 
52 Barb. 581, 583 (1868) (setting forth the undue influence proposition and citing Gibson)). 
109. See also Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 139 P. 879 (Ariz. 1913) (following Strong v. Repide). 
110. Doheny v. Lacy, 61 N.E. 255, 258 (N.Y. 1901) (“That rule, within the cases, requires as a 
basis for its application that a fiduciary relation exist between the parties, which will give to the one, in 
legal presumption, a controlling influence over the other. Such would be the relation of parent and child, 
guardian and ward, trustee and cestui que trust, physician and patient, and attorney and client. In these 
confidential relations the situation of the parties is regarded as unequal, and as conferring upon one a 
certain control or domination over the will, conduct, and interests of the other. Transactions between 
them are, therefore, scrutinized closely, and presumptions arise of their impropriety, which must be met 
where an advantage is derived by the presumably dominant party.”). 
111. In re Weber’s Estate, 194 N.Y.S. 336, 341 (Sur. Ct. 1922); see also In re Van Den Heuvel’s 
Will, 136 N.Y.S. 1109, 1126 (Sur. Ct. 1912). 
112. Von Au v. Magenheimer, 110 N.Y.S. 629, 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908); see also Fischer v. 
Guar. Trust Co., 18 N.Y.S.2d 328, 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940) (following Von Au); Lesnik v. Pub. Indus. 
Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944) (same).  
113. See Rogers v. Am. Tobacco Co., 257 N.Y.S. 321, 323 (Sup. Ct. 1931) and Farmers’ Loan & 
Trust Co. v. Pierson, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 545 (Sup. Ct. 1927) citing Strong v Repide for the proposition: 












relations as “technical” fiduciary relations.114 In Worrall’s Appeal,115 for 
example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in applying the undue influence 
rule referred to its application to “technical fiduciary relations.” 116  In 
Coghill v Kennedy, the Supreme Court of Alabama observed that the 
influence rule “embraces both technical fiduciary relations and those 
informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in and relies upon 
another.”117 Summarizing this position, Charles Beach observed in 1897 
that relations of trust and confidence extend beyond “where there exists a 
formal and technical fiduciary relation . . . .”118 For both Beach and these 
cases a relationship of confidence which did not involve a 
power/undertaking technical fiduciary relation, was not labelled a fiduciary 
relation. However, the adjective “technical” implied that there were other 
non-technical, informal relations which could be designated “fiduciary”; a 
designation that also accords with the literal meaning of the term fiduciary 
reflecting relations of trust and confidence.119 Subsequent courts followed 
this inference where relations of confidence that allowed for influence 
became “informal fiduciary relationship[s].”120 The New York case In re 
Van Den Heuvel’s Will was a first mover in this regard providing that a 
relation of influence arising from a caring/nursing function created “an 
actual, if not a technical, fiduciary relation . . . .”121 For Beach v. Wilton, in 
the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1910, relying on the technical/informal 
distinction, the term “‘fiduciary’ or ‘confidential’ relation . . . is a very broad 
one” which is applicable where “influence has been acquired and abused—
 
114. See CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 1412–13 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold 
eds., 2016), which considers this distinction but attributes it to established fiduciary categories and 
relationship-based fiduciary relations. 
115. 1 A. 380, 388 (Pa. 1885) (followed in Samson v. Samson, 25 N.W. 233 (Iowa 1885)).  
116. Id. at 388.  
117. 24 So. 459, 469 (Ala. 1898). This case is followed widely in the U.S., invariably without 
citation. See, for example, Illinois (Thomas v. Whitney, 57 N.E. 808, 810 (Ill. 1900); Irwin v. Sample, 
72 N.E. 687, 690 (Ill. 1904)); Missouri (Bracken v. Milner, 104 F. 522, 525 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1900)); 
California (Hemenway v. Abbott, 97 P. 190, 196 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1908)); Oklahoma (Ewing v. Ewing, 
126 P. 811, 815 (Okla. 1912)); Maryland (Anderson v. Watson, 118 A. 569, 575 (Md. 1922)); Florida 
(Dale v. Jennings, 107 So. 175, 178 (Fla. 1925)); Hawaii (Meheula v. Hausten, 29 Haw. 304, 314 
(1926)); Utah (Omega Inv. Co. v. Woolley, 271 P. 797, 801 (Utah 1928)); Maine (Eldridge v. May, 150 
A. 378, 379 (Me. 1930)). 
118. CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 1014 (1897). 
119. Edelman, supra note 12, at 304 (considering “the Latin fiducia which means trust or 
confidence”).  
120. See, e.g., In re Munsell’s Guardianship, 31 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Iowa 1948). More recently see 
Apple Recs., Inc. v. Capital Recs. Inc., 529 N.Y.S.2d 279, 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
121. In re Van Den Heuvel’s Will, 136 N.Y.S. 1109, 1126 (Sur. Ct. 1912). 











in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed.”122 Here “fiduciary” 
and “confidential” are not distinct legal ideas but become legal synonyms.123  
Of particular importance for the investigation in this article is the 
Delaware Supreme Court case of Peyton v. William C. Peyton Corp.124 In 
an action to challenge contracts entered into by a wife as a result of the 
alleged undue influence of her deceased husband, the Delaware Supreme 
Court offers a clear account of the fiduciary influence/undue influence 
standard drawing on several New Jersey cases125 that rely heavily on Mott 
v. Mott126 and the background English jurisprudence including Gibson v. 
Jeyes and Huguenin v. Baseley. The court observed:  
Application of the principle is not restricted to cases where, by evil 
design or contrivance to injure another, a benefit has been gained by 
a fiduciary at the expense of his principal; for even though a fiduciary 
has no purpose or intention to take an unfair advantage, equity will 
not lend its aid to the enforcement of the transaction and the fiduciary 
will not be permitted to retain advantage acquired as a consequence 
of it, if the transaction results in inequality and injustice. The purpose 
of the rule is not so much to protect the cestui against the 
consequences of undue influence as it is to safeguard him against the 
results of his own voluntary acts induced by the confidential relation 
between him and his fiduciary the effect of which with respect to his 
own interests he may not fully comprehend.127 
Importantly, in this case the husband was deemed to be a fiduciary,128 not 
because he had undertaken and had been empowered to act on her behalf, 
 
122. Beach v. Wilton, 91 N.E. 492, 495 (Ill. 1910) (citing Mayrand v. Mayrand, 61 N.E. 1040, 
1041 (Ill. 1901)). For the modern imprint of these cases see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 
623 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (setting forth the law through unattributed direct borrowing of the position in Coghill 
v. Kennedy and Beach), rev’d 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1975).  
123. In this regard the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court observed in 1913 that 
“[i]t is said in Anderson’s Dictionary of Law . . . that the words ‘fiduciary’ and ‘confidential’ are 
commonly used by courts and law writers as convertible expressions . . . .” Glover v. Nat’l Bank of 
Com., 156 A.D. 247, 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913); see also Konsuvo v. Netze, 220 A.2d 424, 433 (N.J. 
Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1966) (quoting 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 947B (3d ed. 1964)) (“Such fiduciary 
relation is not limited to cases of trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, or 
other recognized legal relations, but it exists in all cases where confidence is reposed on the one side 
and a resulting superiority and influence on the other side arises therefrom.”); Eldridge v. May, 150 A. 
378, 379 (Me. 1930). 
124. 7 A.2d 737 (Del. 1939). 
125. See e.g., Slack v. Rees, 59 A. 466, 467 (N.J. 1904); Pattberg v. Gott, 140 A. 795 (N.J. Ch. 
1928); Hall v. Otterson, 28 A. 907 (N.J. Ch. 1894). 
126. 22 A. 997 (N.J. Ch. 1891); see also supra text accompanying notes 87–90. 
127. Peyton, 7 A.2d at 747 (emphasis added). 












but because “[c]onfidential and fiduciary relations have the same meaning 
in law,”129 and: 
[A]s every fiduciary relation implies a condition of superiority of one 
of the parties over the other, equity raises a presumption against the 
validity of a transaction by which the superior obtains a possible 
benefit at the expense of the inferior, and casts upon him the burden 
of showing affirmatively his compliance with all equitable requisites. 
So, the principle is well established that a person standing in a 
confidential relation towards another may not retain benefits 
conferred by his principal in a transaction as to which competent 
independent advice is considered necessary, except upon a 
satisfactory showing that the principal had such advice in conferring 
the benefits.130 
Of particular note in this regard is that this statement of the law is taken, 
largely verbatim, from the 1892 edition of Pomeroy on Equity 
Jurisprudence,131  which Peyton merely cites.132  Pomeroy also observed, 
consistent with the influence understanding of fiduciary relations that: 
It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle 
extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as 
a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and the 
resulting superiority and influence on the other. The relation and the 
duties involved in it need not be legal; it may be moral, social, 
domestic, or merely personal.133 
Pomeroy also provided, consistent with this conception,134 that as regards 
dealings in shares directors owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders directly: 
On the other hand, the directors and managing officers occupy the 
position of quasi trustees towards the stockholders alone, and not at 
all towards the corporation, with respect to their shares of stock. 
Since the stockholders own these shares, and since the value thereof 
and all their rights connected therewith are affected by the conduct of 
 
129. Id. at 747 (emphasis added). 
130. Id. (emphasis added). 
131. 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 956 (2d ed. 1892) 
(citing multiple English influence cases including Huguenin v. Baseley and Tate v. Williamson (1866) 
2 Ch. App. 55.  
132. Peyton, 7 A.2d at 747 (citing POMEROY, supra note 131). 
133. POMEROY, supra note 131, at § 956 (second emphasis added). Note this quote was influential 
on the treatment of confidential relations as fiduciary relations, including in Beach v. Wilton, 91 N.E. 
492 (Ill. 1910). See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
134. But see id. § 1090 n.1 (citing contrary decisions and acknowledging that “no single decision, 
so far as I am aware, attempts to give the complete analysis or to formulate the entire results”). 











the directors, a trust relation plainly exists between the stockholders 
and the directors, which is concerned with and confined to the shares 
of stock held by the stockholders; from it arise the fiduciary duties of 
the directors towards the stockholders in dealings which may affect 
the stock and the rights of the stockholders therein, and their equitable 
remedies for a violation of those duties. To sum up: directors and 
managing officers, in addition to their functions as mere agents, 
occupy a double position of partial trust; they are quasi or sub modo 
trustees for the corporation with respect to the corporate property, and 
they are quasi or sub modo trustees for the stockholders with respect 
to their shares of the stock.135 
Accordingly, paraphrasing Mott v. Mott, for Pomeroy and, therefore, for 
Peyton, a fiduciary is a person in whom “whether by legal, natural or 
conventional means . . . confidence is naturally inspired, is presumed or in 
fact reasonable exists.” 136 If the circumstances render it reasonable for A to 
rely on B to consider A’s interests a fiduciary relation and concomitant 
fiduciary duties exist. 
Delaware corporate law initially resisted the conflation of the fiduciary 
relation and equity’s regulation of undue influence which we see in Peyton. 
In the important takeover defence case of Kors v. Carey,137 the Chancery 
Court followed Strong v. Repide in observing that “directors generally do 
not occupy a fiduciary position vis à vis individual stockholders in direct 
personal dealings . . . .”138 Yet, consistently with Strong and the undue 
influence standard, Kors acknowledged that relief was available “where 
advantage is taken of inside information and the like. . . .”139 Six years later 
in Lank v. Steiner,140 a case dealing with the validity of options to buy stock 
granted by a shareholder to directors, the Delaware Supreme Court 
approved Kors while at the same time implying that the existence of special 
facts and circumstances141 produce a fiduciary relation; a position set forth 
in counsel’s submission that “under special circumstances a director of 
corporation acts in a fiduciary capacity when dealing with a stockholder for 
the purchase of his stock.”142 The majority found that there was no such 
 
135. Id. at § 1090 (emphasis added). In Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), although the court 
cites Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277 (Kan. 1904), which draws on this position in Pomeroy, the court does 
not follow Pomeroy’s lead in relation to the fiduciary conclusion.  
136. This is my, not Peyton’s, paraphrasing.  
137. 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960). 
138. Id. at 143. 
139. Id. at 143. 
140. 224 A.2d 242 (Del. 1966). 
141. Id. at 244; see id. at 266 (summarizing Kors). But see id. at 266 (citing Peyton and Pomeroy 
that the undue influence doctrine could apply to a non-fiduciary). 












relationship of confidence and reliance between the director and 
stockholder-vendor. Justice Hermann dissented, asking: “does not the 
fiduciary relation arise from the confidence and trust which put the Steiners 
in a position to exert influence over the Lanks . . . ?”143  
Subsequent cases readily fiduciarized the holding in Lank. For example, 
in Cheese Shop International, Inc. v. Steele,144 the Chancery Court relied on 
Lank and Peyton for the proposition that: 
A fiduciary relationship is a situation where one person reposes 
special trust in and reliance on the judgment of another or where a 
special duty exists on the part of one person to protect the interests 
of another. The relationship connotes a dependence. A fiduciary 
relation implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties over 
the other.145 
A more recent example of the fiduciarization of the holding in Lank is In re 
Wayport Inc. Litigation, where the Chancery Court observed: 
The fourth scenario arises when a corporate fiduciary buys shares 
directly from or sells shares directly to an existing outside 
stockholder. Under the “special facts doctrine” adopted by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Lank v. Steiner, a director has a fiduciary 
duty to disclose information in the context of a private stock sale 
“only when a director is possessed of special knowledge . . . .”146 
Note also that such a fiduciary duty is treated as a component part of her 
“director’s” fiduciary duties, rather than as an additional and distinct 
obligation incurred as a result of the fact that the purchaser, who happens to 
be a director, has acquired information in her role as a director which 
generates a condition of superiority. 
II. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AS FIDUCIARIES 
A. Regulating Going-Privates Lord Eldon Style  
In Part II, this article explores the infusion of the influence conception 
of fiduciary relations outlined in Section I into modern Delaware law 
through the case law on going-private transactions. More broadly, it 
explores the structural effects of this conception on Delaware corporate 
fiduciary law. But before doing so, it is helpful to this analysis to be able to 
 
143. Id. at 271 n.2 (Herrmann, J., dissenting). 
144. 303 A.2d 689 (Del. Ch. 1973), rev’d, 311 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973). 
145. Id. at 690 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
146. 76 A.3d 296, 315 (Del. Ch. 2013) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Lank, 224 
A.2d at 244).  











locate it in an understanding of how going-privates would be regulated 
where courts only understood fiduciary relations through the 
power/undertaking understanding of the fiduciary, which rests on Lord 
Eldon’s foundational jurisprudence and, as we explore in Part II.B below, 
was how Delaware’s corporate law courts understood fiduciary relations 
prior to the 1970s.  
For a controlling shareholder to be treated as power/undertaking 
fiduciary, the shareholder would have to exercise corporate power.147 In 
relation to board power the first question we need to answer is what type of 
controller activity is sufficient to be deemed to exercise power and be 
deemed to have undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the corporation. Is it, 
for example, sufficient to have appointed the board members, or for board 
members to be affiliated with the controller; or does there need to be 
evidence of more active intervention to further the controller’s position? As 
a controller is not a fiduciary merely because she is capable of undertaking 
to perform a role and capable of exercising power/being empowered, one 
would expect that a high level of intervention would be required for 
fiduciary obligation to be triggered. Once triggered, the second question 
which then arises is which duties apply to such a fiduciary? As the 
traditional conception of the fiduciary obligation flows from undertaking 
and empowerment, it is clear that the controller’s exercise of power would 
be subject to the business judgment rule and fairness review. 148 
Accordingly, a going-private merger where the controlling parent is a 
fiduciary in relation to the subsidiary company—an archetypal self-dealing 
contract—would be subject to fairness review. As these duties arise from 
the parent’s usurpation of subsidiary board power they are owed to and must 
be enforced by, or derivatively on behalf of, the subsidiary.149 But where the 
controller has not intervened in the operation of the board and the subsidiary 
operates as an independent entity, then in relation to the exercise of board 
power the parent is not a power/undertaking fiduciary and fairness review 
as the product of fiduciary obligation would not be triggered.  
But before leaving the domain of fiduciary obligation we need to 
consider the effect of the parent controlling the subsidiary’s shareholder 
meeting approval of the merger: an exercise of corporate power in relation 
to the merger. Would this alone result in the controller being deemed to be 
a fiduciary in this transaction? Corporate law has long recognised that 
general meeting power is subject to a good faith corporate interest 
restriction, generating a form of rationality review of the exercise of meeting 
 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 16–40. 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48.  












power. 150  However, this alone would not have deemed a majority 
shareholder exercising her votes to be a fiduciary.151 Although the general 
meeting does exercise power on behalf of the corporation, it is difficult to 
view the collective body as having undertaken a representative role to act 
for or on behalf of the corporation, as opposed to merely exercising 
corporate power when it is asked to do so. Although clearly, if the majority 
shareholder’s actions can be understood to involve such an undertaking then 
it would be a fiduciary in exercising that power unless it took steps to 
neutralise its power in that vote, by not voting or, to the same effect, by 
providing for a majority of the minority approval requirement.152 
Of course, through a traditional, non-fiduciary understanding of the 
undue influence doctrine, as articulated in Gibson, Huguinen, and Cowee, 
given the “overmastering” influence of the parent over the subsidiary, as 
well as legitimate concerns of the subsidiary’s minority shareholders about 
abuse of that influence to their detriment, in most going-private mergers 
even where the parent is not a power/undertaking fiduciary, fairness review 
would be applicable. This would require fair dealing but also, in the 
traditional reading of the doctrine, may require fair price. To neutralize the 
scope for such undue influence intervention, the parent would have to neuter 
its potential influence. It could do this by providing an effective special 
committee of independent directors and a majority of the minority 
condition, as well as by ensuring that no threats of abuse of influence were 
made or implied. Even then, as evidenced by the traditional undue influence 
doctrine, fairness review as to price may still take place where courts are 
unconvinced that the influence has been defused. Importantly, through this 
traditional lens, such conditions would not be the product of fiduciary 
obligation.153 
 
150. An early New York Court of Appeals case, Gamble v. Queens Cnty. Water Co., 25 N.E. 201, 
202 (N.Y. 1890) serves to make this point:  
Their action resulting from such votes must not be so detrimental to the interests of the 
corporation itself as to lead to the necessary inference that the interests of the majority of the 
shareholders lie wholly outside of and in opposition to the interests of the corporation, and of 
the minority of the shareholders, and that their action is a wanton or a fraudulent destruction 
of the rights of such minority. In such cases it may be stated that the action of the majority of 
the shareholders may be subjected to the scrutiny of a court of equity at the suit of the minority 
shareholders.  
See id. (emphasis added) (noting that “[t]hese views are exemplified in the comparatively recent English 
case” Nw. Transp. Co. v. Beatty (1887) 12 App. Cas. 589 (PC)). For the Court of Appeals in Gamble, 
judicial intervention was only possible in relation to egregious exercises of power which “plainly 
show[]” that the action was “so far opposed to the true interests of the corporation” that it could not be 
made sense of as action which furthered the corporate interest. Id. (emphasis added).  
151. Note in this regard that corporate law has long recognised that shareholders can vote the 
shares in their own interests (Gamble v. Queens Cnty. Water Co., 25 N.E. 201, 202 (N.Y. 1890)). 
152. For an interesting modern UK case in this regard, see Lehtimäki v. Cooper [2020] UKSC 33.  
153. See supra notes 72–91. 











Where the parent makes an offer to buy the shares of the minority 
position rather than merging with the subsidiary, even if it is a fiduciary 
because it has usurped subsidiary board power this is not a self-dealing 
contract because the parent does not exercise subsidiary board power154 
when making the offer, nor does it exercise decision making power on 
behalf of the minority shareholders. However, following Gibson, 
Hueguenin, and their American progeny, it is also clear given the scope of 
the controlling shareholder’s ability to influence the minority shareholder’s 
decision—through, inter alia, any exercise of subsidiary board power, fear 
of retribution, or an intended back-end squeeze out through a short-form 
merger—that the undue influence rule would apply regardless of whether 
or not the controlling shareholder is a fiduciary.155 As noted this would 
require fair dealing but may also, in the traditional reading of the doctrine, 
require fair price. Fair dealing could entail disclosure of information not 
available to the minority, the isolation of the parent from any exercise of 
subsidiary board power that relates to the offer, care not to threaten any form 
of retribution, and a mandatory extended offering period156 to enable exit 
for those shareholders who initially say “no” (a much more effective 
pressure-release than a majority of the minority tender requirement). And 
again, fair price could be deployed by the courts when not satisfied that the 
process protections have enabled truly voluntary decision making. 
Moreover, any such action would be brought in the shareholder’s individual 
capacity as the party contracting with the controlling shareholder-offeror, 
subject to its “overmastering influence” which may have infected the 
formation of such minority shareholder’s intention to agree to enter into 
contractual relations with the controller.157  
B. Controllers’ Fiduciary Power in the Supreme Court  
The idea that controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary obligation to 
minority shareholders has a long pedigree in the United States. Until the late 
twentieth century, considered in Part C below, this idea was firmly rooted 
in the power/undertaking lens. However, as in the case of a director’s 
fiduciary duties, which the earliest corporate cases provided were owed to 
 
154. Although clearly if it exercises subsidiary board power such an exercise is subject to fiduciary 
obligation. 
155. See supra text to notes 86–91. 
156. Pursuant to Rule 14d-11 of Regulation 14D, any extended offering period is at the bidder’s 
election. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-11 (2020). 












both the corporation and the shareholders, the actual nature and recipients 
of these obligations needs to be carefully parsed.158  
Justice Brandeis’s decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert 159  is 
viewed as a foundational case in this regard. For Brandeis, “the majority has 
a right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary position toward 
the minority” and “majority stockholders exercising control”—and 
“dominat[ing] its affairs”—“are deemed trustees for the minority” because 
of “the fact of control of the common property held and exercised.”160  
The majority’s “exercis[e] [of] control” and “the dominat[ion] of [the 
corporation’s] affairs” are central to the Court’s conclusion about fiduciary 
position—reflecting a power/undertaking fiduciary lens. However, the 
focus on trusteeship and common property appears to disregard the 
corporation as a separate legal entity and treats the corporation, in effect, as 
a general partnership. Brandeis’s language and position are, however, more 
comprehensible in the light of the facts of this case, which involved an 
allegation that the defendant former-controlling shareholders had 
effectively embezzled all the corporation’s assets, and a claim by the 
minority for its share in the “common property” now held on trust by the 
former-controlling shareholder. 161  That is, the unlawful transfer of the 
corporation’s assets to the controller alone meant that the controller was 
both in breach of its fiduciary obligation and was now a constructive trustee 
for the minority in relation to its share of the assets. Notably, the District 
Court at first instance simply held that “the minority stockholders had rights 
which they could enforce against the property in the hands of the majority 
stockholders.”162 The Supreme Court noted similarly that “the minority may 
not be excluded from a fair participation in the fruits of the sale.”163 In doing 
so it cited Menier v. Hooper’s Telegraph Works,164 a nineteenth-century 
English case in which a controlling shareholder effectively received side 
payments to ensure that the board of the company elected not to enforce a 
claim against a former director, which was the company’s only asset.165 The 
English Court of Appeal in Meiner observed that “the majority of 
shareholders cannot sell the assets of the company and keep the 
consideration, but must allow the minority to have their share.”166  The 
 
158. Considered in Part I above, showing that duties “owed to the stockholders” were owed to the 
corporation. See text accompanying notes 49–71. 
159. 250 U.S. 483 (1919) (“Southern Pacific”). 
160. Id. at 487–88, 491, 492 (emphasis added). 
161. Id. at 487, 491. 
162. Bogert v. S. Pac. Co., 226 F. 500, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1915) (emphasis added).  
163. S. Pac. Co., 250 U.S. at 488. 
164. (1874) 9 Ch. App. 350, 354. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 354. 











judgment in Menier did not elaborate on the legal basis for the claim nor did 
it label the controller a fiduciary, but importantly the claim was brought 
derivatively and the court considered the basis for it being brought 
derivatively, evidencing that any duty was owed to, or any right was held 
by, the company (the “proper Plaintiff”), not to or by the minority 
shareholders directly.167 
Southern Pacific also drew on several similarly situated cases where 
controlling shareholders acted to obtain the company’s assets below value. 
As in Southern Pacific, in setting forth the duties of the controllers, the 
corporate identity of the subject company often appears to be ignored. Ervin 
v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., an 1884 case which also relied on 
Menier v. Hooper’s Telegraph Works, involved the exercise of the power to 
wind-up the company by the shareholder meeting and a sale at an alleged 
undervalue of the company’s property to the majority shareholder.168 The 
United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York identified 
the fiduciary relation of “quasi trustees” between the majority and minority 
shareholders as “equitable joint-owners of the [corporate] property . . . .”169 
But importantly, the court recognised that the rights that were infringed by 
the controllers taking of that property were the company’s rights, and that 
the plaintiff shareholders were only allowed to bring the action themselves 
because the decision to dissolve the corporation “terminated the 
conventional relations between the corporation and its stockholders”170 and, 
accordingly, the company was “so far extinct that it cannot stand in the way 
of the enforcement by its former stockholders . . . .”171 Again, ostensibly 
direct fiduciary relations between the controlling shareholder and the 
minority, which regulate the exercise of a power (the power to dissolve the 
corporation),172 are placed within the umbrella of corporate rights to be 
enforced by the corporation. 
Shortly after Ervin, in Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & 
Northern Railway Company173 —another case cited in Southern Pacific 
involving allegations of controlling shareholder expropriation of corporate 
assets—the Court of Appeals of New York held that:  
Where . . . a majority of the stock is owned by a corporation or a 
combination of individuals, and it assumes the control of another 
 
167. Id. at 353–54. 
168. 20 F. 577 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884). 
169. Id. at 582. 
170. Id. at 581. 
171. Id.  
172. Id. at 580 (“A majority have no right to exercise the control over the corporate management 
which legitimately belongs to them for the purpose of appropriating the corporate property or its avails 
to themselves . . . .”). 












company’s business and affairs through its control of the officers and 
directors of the corporation, it would seem that, for all practical 
purposes, it becomes the corporation of which it holds a majority of 
stock, and assumes the same trust relation towards the minority 
stockholders that a corporation itself usually bears to its stockholders, 
and therefore, under such circumstances, the rule stated in the Sage 
Case174 and other similar cases applies to majority stockholders who 
control the affairs of the company, as well as to its directors or 
officers.175 
What is meant by this claim that majority shareholders who assume control 
of the company’s business “become the corporation” and thereby become 
trustees of the minority shareholders? Here the court is referring to the effect 
of exercising corporate power. When the board of directors of a corporation 
make a decision, we can understand that decision as the decision of the 
company, as distinct from a decision made on behalf of the company.176 
That is, the board embodies corporate power and the corporation. It is in this 
same sense that in usurping or exercising corporate power the majority 
shareholders embody or “become” the corporation: they substitute 
themselves for the board. Note also in this regard the discussion in Part I 
above, where we showed that statements about directorial duties to the 
stockholders should be understood as duties owed to the stockholders as a 
component part of the corporation; that is, duties owed to the corporation 
(the stockholders “compose” the corporation).177 Farmers’ statement about 
trustee relations with minority shareholders (or any statement about duties 
owed to minority shareholder) should be similarly understood. The New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed this reading of Farmers when, in the same 
year as the Southern Pacific judgment, in Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh 
Knitting Co. it observed that Farmers and Ervin stood for the proposition 
that:  
When a number of stockholders constitute themselves, or are by the 
law constituted [by in this case and in Ervin through the power to 
dissolve the company], the managers of corporate affairs or interests, 
they stand in much the same attitude towards the other or minority 
 
174. 41 N.E. 513 (N.Y. 1895) (one of the foundational fairness review self-dealing cases) 
(emphases added); see also KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 356–61. 
175. Farmers’ Loan, 44 N.E. at 1048–49. 
176. Id. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 49–58. 











stockholders that the directors sustain, generally, towards all the 
stockholders . . . .178  
Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases had clearer sight of the legal and 
descriptively functional components of these cases. Pepper v. Litton179 in 
1939, for example, which relies on Southern Pacific,180 is often cited for the 
proposition that controlling shareholders are fiduciaries.181 The Supreme 
Court clearly adopts a power/undertaking lens in providing that controllers 
only become fiduciaries when they directly or indirectly exercise corporate 
power through their “domination and control” of the board.182 Moreover, 
the fiduciary obligations they owe are to the corporation, whose powers they 
exercise, and are not owed directly to the minority shareholders. We see this 
as these obligations “are enforce[ed] directly by the corporation, or through 
a stockholder’s derivative action.” 183  To this point the court cited the 
Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court decision in Converse v. United Shoe 
Machinery Co. that “[t]he wrong, if any, was done not to the plaintiffs as 
individual stockholders but to the corporation, and the remedy must be 
sought by or on behalf of the corporation.”184 
C. Fiduciary Conceptions in Delaware’s Going-Private Law 
1. Power/undertaking in Delaware’s going-privates 
The earliest of Delaware cases addressing controlling shareholder 
fiduciaries drew on, inter alia, several of the cases discussed above to apply 
a power focused understanding of when controlling shareholders could 
become corporate fiduciaries. In Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation v. 
 
178. 123 N.E. 148, 151 (N.Y. 1919). On directors’ duties to the stockholders see supra Section 
I.A.3. 
179. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
180. Id. at 306. 
181. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969); Westgor v. Grimm, 
318 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1982); cf. Frieler v. Rueping Inc., No. 84-602, 1985 WL 188178, at *6 n.4 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1985). 
182. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306 (“A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling 
stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are powers in trust.”) (citations omitted). 
183. Id. at 307 (observing further in this regard that the “standard of fiduciary obligation is 
designed for the protection of the entire community of interests in the corporation”). Fiduciary 
obligations can also be enforced in bankruptcy trustee acting for the corporation.  
184. 95 N.E. 929, 929 (Mass. 1911). It is noteworthy that in the footnote to the statement by the 
Supreme Court in Pepper (after the cite to Converse), the court also observes that “[i]t is also clear that 
breach of that fiduciary duty may also give rise to direct actions by stockholders in their own right.” 
Pepper, 308 U.S. at 307 n.15. The cases cited in this footnote, however, evidence not that a director’s 
fiduciary duties can be enforced directly, but only that directors may take on other roles vis a vis the 
shareholders that are fiduciary in nature, and, necessarily, therefore directly enforced. See, e.g., Strong 
v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419. 423 (1909) (referring to an agency role for the shareholders). The Court also 












Steel & Tube Co. of America,185  the plaintiffs challenged a shareholder 
resolution to approve the sale of the corporation’s assets as required by the 
Delaware corporate code. For the Chancery Court, fiduciary relations were 
inextricably tied to the exercise of corporate power: 
When, in the conduct of the corporate business, a majority of the 
voting power in the corporation join hands in imposing its policy 
upon all, it is beyond all reason and contrary, it seems to me, to the 
plainest dictates of what is just and right, to take any view other than 
that they are to be regarded as having placed upon themselves the 
same sort of fiduciary character which the law impresses upon the 
directors in their relation to all the stockholders. Ordinarily the 
directors speak for and determine the policy of the corporation. When 
the majority of stockholders do this, they are, for the moment, the 
corporation. Unless the majority in such case are to be regarded as 
owing a duty to the minority such as is owed by the directors to all, 
then the minority are in a situation that exposes them to the grossest 
frauds and subjects them to most outrageous wrongs.186 
The Court in Allied bears the imprint of Farmers.187 Note in particular that 
in an exercise of corporate power the majority shareholders “are . . . the 
corporation”; that is, they become or embody the corporation, thereby 
generating fiduciary obligations akin to those the directors owe 
stockholders.188 But as discussed above, references to directorial duties to 
stockholders in Delaware and elsewhere was one means of articulating the 
position that directors owe their duties to the corporation whose powers they 
exercise, where the stockholders “convene” the company. 189  Majority 
stockholder duties to the minority shareholders should be similarly 
construed: when they exercise corporate power they assume a duty to the 
corporation to exercise power to further the interests of all shareholders. 
A half century later in Harriman v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,190 
which involved a challenge to a merger between a major shareholder and 
Du Pont, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware provided an 
impeccable summary of the position on the incurrence and nature of 
controlling shareholder duties articulated in Allied, a position wholly 
 
185. 120 A. 486, 491–95 (Del. Ch. 1923) (first citing and strongly influenced by Farmers’ Loan, 
then discussing Ervin, and then discussing Kavanaugh). 
186. Id. at 491. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 3–177. 
188. Allied, 120 A. 486 at 491 (“The same considerations of fundamental justice which impose a 
fiduciary character upon the relationship of the directors to the stockholders will also impose, in a proper 
case, a like character upon the relationship which the majority of the stockholders bear to the minority.”). 
189. See discussion supra Section I.A.3. 
190. 372 F. Supp. 101 (D. Del. 1974). 











congruent with the power/undertaking understanding of the fiduciary 
relation articulated above: 
Under Delaware law a stockholder who in fact controls the 
management of a Delaware corporation owes a fiduciary duty to that 
corporation and its shareholders. Presumably, a nonstockholder who 
usurps the function of the Board of Directors of a Delaware 
corporation or otherwise directs its activities assumes the same 
fiduciary duty as its directors have. . . .  
 Under the Delaware cases which speak of fiduciary duty to a 
corporation or its stockholders in contexts like those described above, 
that duty arises from the exercise of power with respect to that 
corporation. It is only when a person affirmatively undertakes to 
dictate the destiny of the corporation that he assumes such a fiduciary 
duty . . . to protect the interests of the DuPont stockholders.191 
Note first that through this power/undertaking fiduciary lens, it is “only” 
where the controller “affirmatively undertakes to dictate” and “usurp” 
corporate power that it becomes subject to fiduciary obligation. Moreover, 
in relation to a controlling shareholder, or another person who exercises 
corporate power, through this fiduciary lens fiduciary duties are owed only 
when power is actually exercised and not when it is not—even when it has 
been usurped on a prior occasion; unless such prior usurpation can be 
deemed to maintain control over corporate power and policy.192  
There are multiple other mid-to-late-twentieth-century reference points 
in Delaware jurisprudence for the position that controlling shareholder 
duties arise when the controllers exercise corporate power and that the 
duties they owe are coextensive with the duties owed by directors and relate 
to the exercise of that power. And, as with directorial fiduciary duties and 
the prior controlling shareholder case law, reference to duties to minority 
shareholders do not refer to a direct fiduciary duty to the minority 
shareholders, but rather to such shareholders as part of the corporation. 
Consider, for example, David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill International, 
Inc., which involved both a motion for a preliminary injunction to challenge 
the fairness of a going-private merger with Spalding, which did not benefit 
from an independent board committee or minority of the majority approval 
conditionality, and a claim that Dunhill had taken corporate opportunities 
belonging to Spalding which were not taken account of in the merger 
price.193 The court accepted that Dunhill owed fiduciary duties “to [the 
corporation] and the minority shareholders” as it “dominate[d] and 
 
191. Id. at 105–06 (emphases added). 
192. See supra text accompanying notes 24–29. 












controll[ed]” Spalding. 194  The Chancery Court relied upon and quoted 
Allied to the effect that when the majority “determine the policy of the 
corporation” it owes “a duty to the minority such as is owed by the directors 
to all . . . .” 195  Also following Allied and echoing Farmers, the court 
observed that “[o]rdinarily the directors speak for and determine the policy 
of the corporation. When the majority of the stockholders do this, they are, 
for the moment, the corporation.”196 Accordingly, the merger was subject to 
fairness review as it was a self-dealing transaction and Dunhill was subject 
to the corporate opportunity doctrine set forth in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 197 
requiring a determination of whether the opportunity “belonged to [the 
company],” evidencing unequivocally that the duty in this regard was owed 
to the corporation.198  
Relying, inter alia, on Dunhill, the Delaware Supreme Court in Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Levien199 similarly considered the application of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine to a controlling shareholder who “dominated” the 
corporation (an action that was brought derivatively to enforce the 
corporation’s rights). 200  Later going-private mergers also fit within this 
power-focused lens. In Singer v. Magnavox Co., 201  for example, the 
Delaware Supreme Court refers to the “settled rule of law in Delaware” that 
the majority shareholder/“dominant corporation” owed the minority “a 
fiduciary obligation in dealing with the [corporation’s] property” and that 
“those who control the corporate machinery owe a fiduciary duty to the 
minority in the exercise thereof over corporate powers and property.”202 
This duty tracked the directorial obligations of “loyalty, good faith and 
fairness” in the exercise of that power.203 Here the subsidiary board was 
controlled by or incentivised to act in accordance with the parent’s 
wishes.204 Summarizing Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court in Roland 
International Corp. v. Najjar referred to the majority shareholders “who 
 
194. Id. at 429. 
195. Id. at 434 (quoting Allied, 120 A. at 491) (emphasis added). 
196. Id. at 434 (quoting Allied, 120 A. at 491). 
197. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
198. Dunhill, 249 A.2d at 434 (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 513–15). 
199. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
200. Id. at 719 (“By reason of Sinclair’s domination, it is clear that Sinclair owed Sinven a 
fiduciary duty.”). 
201. 380 A.2d. 969 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
202. Id. at 976 and 979 (emphasis added); see also Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 
107, 109–10 (Del. 1952) (referring to “the settled rule of law that . . . [the] majority stockholder . . . 
occup[ies], in relation to the minority, a fiduciary position in dealing with [the corporation’s] property”). 
Sterling also refers to Allied and fits within the usurping corporate power lens. Id. at 112, 116. 
203. Singer, 380 A.2d at 977. 
204. In Singer the question was not addressed in detail as the defendant shareholder conceded the 
existence of fiduciary relation. Id. at 977. Note that the power/undertaking framework itself does not tell 
us about the forms of intervention that amount to “domination” or “usurpation”.  











have the power to control corporate property and,” echoing Harriman, 
“corporate destiny.”205 
Singer and Harriman, along with Allied, also direct us to the question of 
whether the parent’s exercise of power in general meeting—which does not 
involve the usurpation of board power or the domination of the company or 
the board, but rather the exercise of powers which the statute provides are 
to be exercised by the general meeting—renders the controller a 
power/undertaking fiduciary. As noted above when considering going-
privates “Lord Eldon style,”206 without more there is no undertaking given 
by the controller to exercise such powers for the corporation, which is why 
corporate law has long recognised that shares could be voted in the 
shareholders own interests. 207  In the context of going-privates, several 
Delaware courts have side-stepped this and, focusing on the exercise of 
power alone, have treated such majority shareholders as fiduciaries. In 
Harriman, for example, the court held: “[W]e may assume for present 
purposes that a fiduciary duty may arise from the exercise of a stockholder 
power by a majority stockholder in his capacity as such, absent any intrusion 
in the affairs of the board of directors.”208 In Allied, although clearly the 
court contemplates different ways in which the majority imposes its will on 
the corporation, the case did not focus on a usurpation of board power but 
on the exercise of general meeting power in relation to the sale of the 
company’s assets.209 Similarly, in Singer, the focus of the court’s fiduciary 
analysis is on the exercise of the merger vote.210 
2. The Infusion of Fiduciary Influence in Going-Private Mergers 
Congruent in time with Delaware corporate law’s acceptance of the 
fiduciary influence conception through Lank v. Steiner 211  and Cheese 
Shop, 212  the going-private case law started to co-mingle the fiduciary 
influence conception with the power/undertaking conception, which, as we 
have seen above, dominated Delaware’s treatment of controller fiduciary 
duties through to the 1970s. This section and the following section tracks 
and explores the effects of this influence infusion in the going-private case 
law, first in relation to mergers, and then tender offers. 
 
205. 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del. 1979), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 
1983). 
206. See supra Section II.A. 
207. Gamble v. Queens Cnty. Water Co., 25 N.E. 201, 202 (N.Y. 1890). 
208. 372 F. Supp. 101, 106 (D. Del. 1974). 
209. 120 A. 486, 490–93 (Del. Ch. 1923). 
210. 380 A.2d. 972 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
211. 224 A.2d 242 (Del. 1966). 
212. 303 A.2d 689 (Del. Ch. 1973), rev’d, 311 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973); see supra text accompanying 












Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., one of Delaware’s leading cases on going-
private mergers, involved a direct class action brought to challenge a going-
private merger between UOP and its parent, Signal Companies, Inc.213 
Weinberger stands, inter alia, for the position that going-private mergers are 
subject to entire fairness review and states clearly that fairness includes 
fairness in relation to both process and price. 214  On one reading of 
Weinberger, it has little to say about the status of the controlling parent as a 
fiduciary because the court based its fairness holding on the conflicts faced 
by the directors who sat on both boards and participated in the subsidiary 
board’s decision, although abstained from voting.215 However, the case is 
generally understood to require entire fairness review even in the absence 
of cross directorships where a fiduciary controller “stands on both sides of 
[the] transaction . . . .”216  
For the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger, “Signal owed a 
fiduciary responsibility . . . to UOP’s minority”217 and was held to be in 
breach of its “fiduciary duty.”218 The court does not provide an account of 
why it reaches this conclusion about Signal’s fiduciary status, allowing a 
reading of the parent as fiduciary through both the power/undertaking and 
the influence lenses. On the one hand, although it exercised no power 
through the general meeting’s approval of the merger because of a majority 
of the minority requirement, at the time of the merger seven of the directors 
were affiliated with, worked for, or were on the board of Signal and the facts 
evidenced a significant degree of intervention in UOP’s board-approval 
process.219 Through this lens, the position that fairness review applied when 
“one stands on both sides of the transaction”220 can be understood to reflect 
the traditional self-dealing position that fairness review applies when a 
fiduciary exercises power when faced with a conflicting interest or a 
conflicting duty on the other side of the transaction.221 On the other hand 
 
213. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
214. Id. at 711. 
215. Id. at 708. See discussion of the obligations of dual directors, id. at 710–711. Note that as 
they did not exercise power in the vote, the influence lens is also arguably the natural lens for 
understanding directorial obligations and fairness review of the transactions. See KERSHAW, supra note 
3, at 341–65. Of course, the boundary line between exercising power and abstention is blurred in cases 
such as Weinberger where the directors actively participated in board deliberation. Weinberger, 457 
A.2d at 707. 
216. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The 
Rise and Fall of Delaware’s Takeover Standards, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 
(Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2019) at 34–35. 
217. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705. 
218. Id. at 703. 
219. Id. at 704–07. The court cites several of the key power/undertaking cases discussed above in 
Section II.C.1. See id. at 710 (citing, for example, Dunhill). 
220. Id. at 710. 
221. Id. (“Signal cannot escape the effects of the conflicts it faced, particularly when its designees 
on UOP’s board did not totally abstain from participation in the matter.”).  











there is a strong reading of the case that Signal had a fiduciary responsibility 
simply because it was a majority shareholder; that is, as Vice Chancellor 
Short put it in Cheese Shop: “A fiduciary relation implies a condition of 
superiority of one of the parties [the majority shareholder] over the other 
[the minority shareholders].”222  The Court in Weinberger cites Lank v. 
Steiner223 and refers to the earlier tender-offer going-privates which also 
draw on Lank, 224  and its consideration of the absence of an effective 
independent board is concerned with process not power.225 Through this 
lens the statement that fairness review is required when “one stands on both 
sides of [the] transaction”226 must be parsed differently. It is the capacity of 
the parent, as majority shareholder in the subsidiary, to influence, cajole, 
and threaten the minority to say “yes” which generates its fiduciary 
responsibility and requires fairness review. And it is the concern about 
influence that drives Weinberger’s holding that entire fairness review is 
concerned with process as well as price.227 
Fairness review going to price in the history of corporate law in the 
United States is the product of the power/undertaking fiduciary conception 
and the remedial effects of the no-conflict rule, which provided for a 
prohibition of self-dealing contracts—which necessarily involve a conflict 
between undertaken duty and the director’s personal interests.228 In relation 
to executed contracts where the director breached the duty, early courts—
first in New Jersey 229  and subsequently in Cahall v. Lofland 230  in 
Delaware—provided that “it would be manifestly inequitable to deny the 
[director] a fair equivalent” for what she had contractually delivered.231 That 
 
222. Cheese Shop Int’l v. Steel, 303 A.2d 689 (Del. Ch. 1973), rev’d, 311 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973) 
(citing Peyton v. William C. Peyton Corp., 7 A.2d 737, 747 (Del. 1939)); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 124–146.  
223. 224 A.2d 242 (Del. 1966). 
224. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711–12, referring to Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 
497 (Del. 1981), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703–704 (Del. 1983) (overruled 
in relation to the calculation of monetary relief). 
225. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (“Given the absence of any attempt to structure this 
transaction on an arm’s length basis, Signal cannot escape the effects of the conflicts it faced, 
particularly when its designees on UOP’s board did not totally abstain from participation in the matter.”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 709 n.7 (“[F]airness in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, 
wholly independent, board of directors acting upon the matter before them . . . .”). Note, however, that 
it is very difficult to identify the lens which structures the decision solely by the focus on the independent 
committee which goes both to power and to fair process.  
226. Id. at 710. 
227. Id. at 710–11. 
228. See KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 322–68. On fairness review, see generally Amir N. Licht, 
Farewell to Fairness: Towards Retiring Delaware’s Entire Fairness Review, 44 DEL. J. CORP L. 1 
(2020); Andrew F. Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 939 (2019). 
229. Gardner v. Butler 30 N.J. Eq. 702 (1879). 
230. 114 A. 224 (Del. Ch. 1921). 












is, a no-conflict prohibition became remedial fairness as to price, which 
amounted functionally to a fairness standard. Through this strand, fairness 
as to process was irrelevant because the remedial question was: what were 
the financial consequences of a breach of duty?232 Indeed, if fiduciary power 
is exercised in a self-dealing transaction how could the process ever be fair 
or at arms-length? 
The early formation of Delaware’s directorial fairness review was an 
opaque combination of State corporate laws, some of which deployed 
remedial fairness as to price, and others which developed fairness review in 
relation to process and price through the fiduciary/undue influence standard 
as applied to a director-fiduciary.233  But in Delaware’s pre-Weinberger 
opaque combination of these legal ideas, we find a bias toward fair price in 
both the foundational self-dealing case, Cahall v. Lofland,234 and in the 
leading fairness case of Gottlieb v. Heydn Chemical Corp.,235 which was 
cited by Weinberger. 236  Gottlieb, which involved directors resolving to 
grant to themselves stock options in the company, provided only for fairness 
as to price, requiring the directors to demonstrate that the transaction was 
“at least as favorable to the corporation” as if “the deal had been made with 
strangers . . . .”237 It is Weinberger’s concern with influence which leads 
naturally to the incorporation of fair process (“fair dealing”) alongside fair 
price. Fair price for Weinberger is “the preponderant consideration,” which 
aligns remedial fairness’s exclusive focus on price with the influence 
standard, which focuses primarily on fair process but deploys fairness as to 
price as a means of ensuring actual voluntariness where process features are 
deemed unlikely to neutralise the influence.238  
As noted at several junctures in this article, the longstanding undue 
influence rule provided for fairness review in the context of relations of 
superiority and influence. Weinberger’s holding can be understood, 
therefore, as a straightforward application of an idea formed at the turn of 
the nineteenth century. What this traditional rule did not do, however, was 
deem the dominant party, here the majority shareholder, to be a fiduciary or 
 
232. Gardener, 30 N.J. Eq. at 725 (“The case resolves itself, then, into this question: Have the 
directors, whose action is the subject of controversy, retained for their services more than they are justly 
and reasonably entitled to? The burden is on them to show what they reasonably deserve to have, and 
no unjust exaction will be permitted.”); see KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 332–37. 
233. See KERSHAW, supra note 3, at 341–68. 
234. 114 A. 224 (Del. Ch. 1921). 
235. 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952). 
236. See 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
237. Gottlieb, 90 A.2d at 663. Note that both of these cases involved the exercise of corporate 
power by participating directors.  
238. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. On undue influence and fair price, see supra note 77. 











consider fairness review to be a component part of such fiduciary’s duties.239 
In contrast, in Weinberger if fairness review arises from the regulation of 
influence, not power, then this is understood as a product of the parent 
company’s “fiduciary responsibility” and fairness review determines 
whether it has complied with its fiduciary duty. We see this much more 
clearly in Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,240 where an impeccably 
independent board committee241  and majority of the minority provision 
meant clearly that the majority shareholder, Du Pont, did not exercise direct 
power, dominate the board, or usurp board power.242 Yet, Du Pont was still 
understood to be a fiduciary and fairness review followed as “the majority 
stockholder stand[s] on both sides of the transaction . . . .”243  For the 
Chancery Court, Du Pont was a fiduciary merely because it was a majority 
shareholder who was presumptively in a position of superiority; and, 
following the complainant’s position, as majority shareholder its fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to the minority shareholders 244  required entire fairness 
review of the transaction.245 In Citron it is exclusively the concern with 
influence246 and coercion247 in the process of the minority’s formulation of 
its voting decision that supports the application of entire fairness in relation 
to process and price.248 In this regard, the court provides an account of the 
 
239. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985) (applying fairness review to a 
parent-subsidiary merger without referring at all to the concept of fiduciary). 
240. 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
241. Id. at 494 (discussing how the committee was independent both in theory and practice); see 
also id. at 496 (noting that the independent committee almost ended the negotiations due to a “logjam”). 
242. Id. at 504–05. 
243. Id. at 500. 
244. Id. at 498. 
245. Id. at 502. The Court independently observed that: “It is correct, as plaintiff argues, that 
DuPont, as a fiduciary, had a duty to treat the Remington minority fairly. But that fiduciary duty did not 
require that fairness be measured or determined by any specific valuation method or procedure.” Id. at 
508.  
246. Id. at 502 (referring to “the inherent potential to influence”). 
247. See id. (discussing the existence of “coercion” where none is intended). 
248. Id. In subsequent Delaware case law, courts have held that process protections are sufficient 
to bring fairness review to a close and subject the transaction to business judgment review. See Kahn v. 
M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (2014). Scholars have lamented this decision as representing the 
deterioration of fiduciary standards as compared to Weinberger, one that is explained by a jurisprudential 
shift enabled by the substitution of other governance mechanisms such as institutional shareholder 
monitoring. See Solomon & Thomas, supra note 216. But note that when seen from the vantage point 
of Lord Eldon’s jurisprudence, which provides the unseen foundation for these decisions, the position 
taken in M & F is both defensible and consistent with the prior case law. Where there is an effective 
independent committee and a majority of the minority provision, no power is exercised and influence is 
the only concern. As we have seen, the undue influence concern is with the volition of the inferior party; 
fairness as to price is an option that can be deployed when, in spite of procedural protections, the court 
remains doubtful about fairness in practice. See supra note 77. Where the court is confident about the 
effectiveness of the procedural protections then there is no need to inquire further. If Weinberger is seen 
through the power/undertaking lens, then its entire fairness position is distinct from the position in M&F, 













effect of influence on the voluntariness of the transaction of which Lord 
Eldon would be proud.249 But again, what would have been unrecognisable 
for Eldon is Citron’s fusion of law’s concern to regulate undue or 
overmastering influence and the idea of the fiduciary.250 
Where there is no such fiduciary-influence status, namely where the 
shareholder is not a majority shareholder, Delaware law continues to deploy 
the power/undertaking conception of fiduciary relations. So in Kahn v. 
Lynch Communications Systems,251 for example, to determine whether or 
not a 43% shareholder (Alcatel) was a fiduciary depended on whether it 
exercised “actual control of corporation conduct”252 —that is, exercised 
actual board power.253 The Chancery Court concluded that even though 
Alcatel exercised power in other contexts—and therefore was a 
fiduciary 254 —in this going-private transaction the special committee 
neutralised the exercise of this power, so in effect, Alcatel was not acting in 
 
influence conception, then Weinberger simply did not fully explore the process conditions that would 
satisfy the concern about influence. This deterioration claim (the answer to which is found in exogenous 
drivers such as alternative governance mechanisms) arises from our failure to pay attention to the 
different legal ideas that underpin different entire fairness holdings. If we consider the standard divorced 
from those legal ideas then we will see change when there is none. Note also that this position in M & F 
is consistent with the application of fair process review in other contexts. See Solomon v. Pathe 
Communications 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996); infra text accompanying notes 287–296. What matters is not 
the structure (merger versus tender offer) to which the doctrine applies but the rules and principles that 
determine how the doctrine is applied. 
249. Citron, 584 A.2d at 502. 
250. Or more broadly for Eldon, the trustee. 
251. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). In more recent cases, a shareholder is a fiduciary owing a duty 
of loyalty if it is a controller and (combining fiduciary influence and fiduciary power) it is a controller 
either where, as in Weinberger it is a majority shareholder or, where it is not, it exercises corporate 
power. So, for example, in In re GGP, in stockholder litigation C.A. No. 2018-0267 (2021), the plaintiff 
asserted “breach of fiduciary duty against [the defendant] in its capacity as controlling shareholder” and 
“under Delaware law, a stockholder will be deemed a controlling stockholder where he “(1) owns more 
than 50% of the voting power of a corporation or (2) owns less than 50% of the voting power of the 
corporation but exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation” (at 36 citing In re KKR 
Financial Holdings LLC Shareholder Litigation 101 A.3d 980 (2015)), requiring domination and control 
(at 37). 
252. Id. at 1114 (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 
1989)). 
253. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1114. In Khan, the Delaware Supreme Court cites Ivanhoe Partners v. 
Newmont Mining Corp. as follows: “a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority 
interests in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.” Id. at 1113–14 (quoting 
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987)) (emphasis original). The 
Chancery Court in Kahn observed that: “It is settled law in Delaware that a stockholder owning less than 
50% of the outstanding stock, ‘does not, without more, become a controlling shareholder of that 
corporation, with a concomitant fiduciary status.’” Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., No. 8748, 1993 
WL 290193, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1993) (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 
A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)), rev’d, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). The Chancery Court went on to specify that 
“a minority stockholder that exercises control over the business affairs of a corporation is accountable 
as a fiduciary.” Kahn, 1993 WL 290193, at *2 (citing Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1344). 
254. Kahn, 1993 WL 290193, at *5 (“I find Alcatel to be a fiduciary because of its actual control 
over Lynch’s Board . . . .”). 











a fiduciary capacity in relation to the merger.255 Accordingly it was not 
required to “satisfy the standard of entire fairness . . . .”256 The Chancery 
Court was uncertain what to do thereafter: was the subsidiary’s merger 
merely subject to business judgment review or did fairness review remain 
applicable with the burden shifted to the plaintiff?257 The latter is consistent 
with the undue influence lens, presumptively requiring fairness review in a 
transaction between the fiduciary (Alcatel) and its charge (the company); 
although only exploring fair price where the court harbours doubt about the 
ostensible fairness of the process.258  The Chancery Court proceeded to 
analyze fair price.259  
For the Delaware Supreme Court, Alcatel was also a power/undertaking 
fiduciary, although it disagreed with the Chancery Court’s factual finding 
that the special committee neutralized Alcatel’s usurpation of power in 
relation to the merger.260 The Supreme Court, in contrast to the Chancery 
Court, is unequivocal about the application of entire fairness review,261 
requiring, following Weinberger, fair process and price.262 However, the 
reason for this is not clear from the case; the conclusion is consistent with a 
power/undertaking; fiduciary influence or undue influence conceptual sub-
structure. Is it because Alcatel usurped board power (fairness through a 
power/undertaking lens) by directly coercing the board to do its bidding, 
and thereby exercising power on both sides of the transaction?263  Is it 
because, as in Citron, once designated as a fiduciary, 264  regardless of 
whether power was exercised in relation to this transaction, it owed a duty 
 
255. Id. at *4 (“Although I am satisfied from the evidence that Alcatel did exercise control over 
Lynch . . . it does not necessarily follow that Alcatel also controlled the terms of the merger and its 
approval.”). 
256. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).  
257. Id. at *5. 
258. The understanding is analogous to the situation where a director is not involved in the 
exercise of corporate power in relation to a self-dealing transaction with her. As in Citron, this influence-
induced fairness analysis looks to price, having concluded that the independent board was effective. Id. 
at *5–8. 
259. See id. The Chancery court did not make a legal determination as to review standard as even 
under the more stringent standard the court found the defendants were not in breach. Id. at *5. 
260. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1118 (Del. 1994) (observing that the 
independence of the committee was “suspect from the outset”). 
261. Id. at 1115 (“A controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of the 
transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary [merger], bears the burden of proving its entire fairness.”) (citing 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)).  
262. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. 
263. Note the plaintiffs deployed “coercion” in relation to the board, not the minority 
shareholder’s decision: “[Alcatel] violated [its fiduciary] duties by coercing the Lynch board of directors 
into approving the merger at an unfair price.” Kahn, 1993 WL 290193, at *2.  
264. Although note that the basis for it being a fiduciary is because it exercised power separately, 
not as in Citron, because the controller was an influence fiduciary. In both cases the duties not to abuse 
influence and coerce the decision become fiduciary duties. One way of reading Kahn is that once you 
are separately deemed to be a power/undertaking fiduciary you have (alongside being a majority 












to ensure that it did not indirectly coerce and influence the minority 
shareholders’ decision?265 Or is it simply because in a transaction between 
a power/undertaking fiduciary and its charge (the corporation) fairness 
review polices voluntariness. The court’s rejections of the defendant’s claim 
that it did not “dictate[] the terms of the merger or preclude[] the 
Independent Committee from exercising real bargaining power”266 and its 
concern with whether Alcatel exhibited a “pattern of domination”267 over 
the committee suggest the first interpretation, 268  while its focus on 
“subtle”269 influence over the shareholders and a fiduciary duty owed to “the 
other Lynch shareholders,”270 suggests the second interpretation.271 
The final point to highlight from these cases relates to the nature of the 
claim. A power/undertaking controlling shareholder-fiduciary usurps board 
power (the corporation’s power) and therefore necessarily, as with directors, 
owes its fiduciary obligation to the corporation.272 Thus, the duty should 
only be enforced derivatively on behalf of the corporation. In this 
conception of controller fiduciaries, there is no basis for a direct action by 
other shareholders. But in the influence conception of a controller-fiduciary, 
the duty is necessarily owed to persons who can be affected by the 
fiduciary’s influential or superior position, which in the going-private 
merger are the voting minority shareholders.273 Such a fiduciary duty is 
therefore enforced directly by the shareholders, individually or in a class. It 
is noteworthy that both Weinberger and Kahn were direct actions, 
supporting the fiduciary-influence reading of these cases.274 
 
265. Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
266. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1120 (emphasis added). 
267. Id. at 1118. 
268. Id. 
269.  See id. (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)) (explaining a 
controlling shareholder can “subtly” influence the minority shareholders). 
270. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115–16.  
271. In understanding Delaware’s idea of the fiduciary, “coercion” needs to be carefully parsed 
as it may be relevant to both fiduciary power or influence over voluntariness. Note here in particular the 
ambivalent role of the term “coercion” in Kahn, which operates both in relation to the potential for 
coercion of the minority shareholder’s decision which requires entire fairness review of the transaction 
(fiduciary influence/undue influence), id. at 1116, and also in relation to the coercion of the board 
members in the usurpation of their power (power/undertaking), id. at 1120).  
272. See supra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
274. There is no space to explore this question in this article, but see Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 
1110, 1121 (Del. Ch. 2004) (observing in relation to the law on direct and derivative actions that it 
offered a “state of affairs . . . conducive to expensive litigation . . . [and fell] woefully short of providing 
coherent guidance to this Court’s constituents”).  











3. Fiduciary Influence Interference in Going-Private Tender Offers 
The starting point in exploring the influence conception of fiduciary 
relations in going-private tender offers is Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.275 
This case involved a damages claim by a plaintiff who sold his shares in a 
going-private tender offer by a 53.5% majority shareholder. 276  Vice 
Chancellor Marvel’s starting point was that: 
[T]here is no doubt but that in situations in which the holder of a 
majority of the voting shares of a corporation, as here, seeks to 
impose its will upon minority stockholders, the conduct of such 
majority must be tested by those same standards of fiduciary duty 
which directors must observe in their relations with all their 
stockholders.277 
And, accordingly, for VC Marvel the majority shareholder owed the 
minority shareholders a fiduciary “duty to exercise complete 
candor . . . .”278 Although the court refers to Allied Chemical to support this 
proposition, 279  power is missing in action from this case. The court’s 
concern about the imposition of the majority’s will on the minority is 
concerned with influence only.280 The court does not consider at all the 
extent to which this majority shareholder controlled and dominated the 
board of the target subsidiary, nor, even if it had done so, whether the tender 
offer transaction involved any actual exercise of subsidiary board power. In 
the traditional approach outlined in Section I, this would merely be a case 
of possible undue influence by a non-fiduciary.281 But here that doctrine 
becomes a fiduciary doctrine and the scope to exert such influence renders 
the majority shareholder a fiduciary. This was affirmed on appeal by the 
Delaware Supreme Court which, in contrast to the Chancery Court, drew 
explicitly on Lank v. Steiner 282  to support its summary of the Vice 
Chancellor’s position that “as the majority shareholder of [the corporation, 
 
275. 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev’d, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). 
276. Id. at 571. 
277. Id. at 573 (citing Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 120 A. 486 (Del. Ch. 
1923)). 
278. Lynch, 351 A.2d at 573. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. The court summarizes the plaintiff’s complaint as follows: “[S]he did not have a free and 
meaningful choice of a course of action to take compatible with the advancement of her own best 
interests in response to the offer here in issue and was thereby coerced along with other members of her 
class into electing to embrace one of two alternatives . . . .” Id. 
281. See supra text accompanying notes 72–91. 












it] owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff [minority shareholder] which required 
complete candor . . . .”283  
Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. also enables us also to observe, however, 
that even though it deploys a different influence conception of “the 
fiduciary,” provided that such fiduciaries are only subject to “voluntariness” 
investigation in transactions with the duty recipients (as they are in Lynch), 
then the disturbance generated by the fiduciarization of the influence 
doctrine is trivial. It is only when this idea of the fiduciary is transplanted 
into non-transactional settings or when the duties relevant to power 
fiduciaries are deemed to apply to these new influence fiduciaries—because 
they are both “fiduciaries”—that the transformative potential of this 
conceptual development is realised. 
A thread of subsequent going-private cases builds on Lynch. For 
example, in Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp.,284 the Chancery Court 
observed that “a tender offer—particularly one made by a corporation for 
its own shares—may be voluntary in appearance and form but involuntary 
as a matter of reality and substance,”285 with involuntariness dependent on 
material disclosure failings or evidence of coercion. 286  For Eisenberg, 
following Lynch, such failings amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty by 
the parent-offeror and, as in Lynch, there is no consideration of power or 
usurpation.287 More prominently, in Solomon v. Pathe Communications,288 
the Delaware Supreme Court followed Eisenberg but without the fiduciary 
wrapping;289 a judgment which, standing alone, fits squarely in the legal 
idea articulated in Gibson v. Jeyes290 and Huguenin v. Baseley291 and its 
English and American progeny: voluntariness alone regulates the tender 
offer transaction. In this going-private292 tender offer context, the plaintiff 
asserted that the tender offer was coercive and, as such, was a breach of the 
duty of “loyalty [owed by the bidder] as controlling shareholder.”293 The 
Delaware Supreme Court, however, did not take the fiduciary/duty of 
loyalty bait, and addressed the issue purely through the question of 
 
283. Lynch, 383 A.2d at 279 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). 
284. 537 A.2d 1051 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
285. Id. at 1056. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 1057. (“Where a corporation tenders for its own shares, the exacting duty of disclosure 
imposed upon corporate fiduciaries is even ‘more onerous’ than in a contested offer.”); see also id. at 
1059–60.  
288. 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996). 
289. Id. at 39–40. 
290. (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 1044. 
291. (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 526. 
292. Strictly speaking the offeror had a security claim in relation to a controlling interest that it 
was in the process of enforcing. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 37. 
293. Id. 











voluntariness, disclosure, and coercion.294  In applying this standard, the 
court observed that “in the case of totally voluntary tender offers . . . courts 
do not impose any right of the shareholders to receive a particular price.”295 
For the Delaware Supreme Court, “in the absence of coercion or disclosure 
violations, the adequacy of the price in a voluntary tender offer cannot be 
an issue.”296 For Solomon an evidently fair process pre-empts fair price 
review.297 
The missing fiduciary wrapping in Solomon returns clearly in the 
important case of In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation,298 
which involved a tender offer by Pure Resources Inc.’s parent company, 
Unocal Corporation, which owned 65% of the shares in Pure. The case 
tackled the perceived doctrinal anomaly that, following Kahn, mergers were 
subject to entire fairness review (both fair process and fair price review) and 
tender offers, following Solomon, were subject only to fair process 
requirements. In Pure Resources we start to see more clearly the 
destabilizing effects of the singular idea of the “fiduciary” standing for two 
very separate legal ideas.  
As in Lynch and Citron, in Pure Resources the majority shareholder is 
deemed to be an influence-fiduciary from which fiduciary obligation flows, 
regardless of power.299 As noted, necessarily in a going-private tender offer 
there is no exercise of subsidiary corporate power as a component part of 
the tender offer transaction. It could be exercised to indirectly block the 
transaction, by deploying a poison pill for example, but in relation to the 
transaction between parent-offeror and individual offeree-shareholders, 
there is no exercise of subsidiary corporate power nor, clearly, any 
empowerment of the majority shareholders by the minority. Naturally, 
therefore, it follows that if a majority shareholder is deemed to be a fiduciary 
 
294. Id. at 39–40. 
295. Id. at 39 (citing Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570, 576 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev’d 
on other grounds, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977)). 
296. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 40 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) 
(emphasis added). See also In re Siliconix Incorporated Shareholders Litigation, WL 716787 (Del. 2001) 
at 9, applying Solomon but also referring to the majority shareholders as fiduciaries.  
297. It is worth recalling, however, that the undue influence standard, which Solomon applies even 
though it does not label it as such, has long accepted that fairness review as to price is a means of testing 
voluntariness where, even in the presence of process protections and the absence of formal coercion or 
threats, there remains concern about how the intention to enter legal relations was formed. That is, 
pursuant to the original legal idea which Solomon applies, fairness review in relation to price is a back-
stop option; an option which (as noted above) was taken in Citron but not in M & F, and remains 
available in both mergers and tender offers where courts harbour any doubts about an ostensibly fair 
process. See also supra note 77 and text accompanying notes 248–249. 
298. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).  
299. Id. at 444 (referring to Solomon and the “fiduciary duties of controlling stockholders”). The 
court previously defines the issue, asking “what equitable standard of fiduciary conduct applies when a 
controlling shareholder seeks to acquire the rest of the company’s shares,” and mentions, in its inquiry, 












in a going-private tender offer then that designation can only be a product 
of the influence conception of fiduciary relations; and such fiduciary 
obligation is owed directly to the minority shareholders in receipt of the 
offer.300 
Pure Resources does not analyze this influence-fiduciary designation; it 
presumes it. This presumption generates a fiduciary power-myopia which 
strips the decision in Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 301 
which is central to Strine’s analysis, of its fiduciary power context. Vice 
Chancellor Strine observes that it was “inherent coercion that motivated the 
[Delaware] Supreme Court in [Kahn] . . . to impose the entire fairness 
standard of review . . . even when the merger was approved by an 
independent board majority, negotiated by an independent special 
committee, and subject to a majority of the minority vote condition.”302 As 
noted above, the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn is equivocal in this 
regard.303 On one reading of the case, fair price review (and therefore entire 
fairness) was applicable because the parent exercised corporate power by 
coercing the board and “dictated the terms of the merger,”304  so that it 
exercised power on both sides of the transaction. But there is no 
equivocation for VC Strine, who reads the case solely through the influence 
fiduciary lens: it is the “inherent coercion” (the scope for influence) 
contained in the relationship between controller (“800-pound gorilla”305) 
and minority shareholder which underpins Kahn’s application of entire 
fairness review.306 
Reading Kahn through an influence-only lens leaves “coercion” as the 
primary source of fiduciary obligation in all controlling shareholder 
contexts. Fiduciary obligation, including fairness review, thereby becomes 
“judicial carpentry”307 working with materials consisting of the nature and 
extent of coercion as well as judicial policy analysis which attempts to 
assess the effects of different review standards on corporate and market 
behaviour.308 This reading of Kahn collapses power/undertaking fiduciary 
 
300. Of course, if the majority shareholder usurps board power to prevent to board deploying 
defenses then in relation to that decision the shareholder would be subject to fiduciary duties through 
the power/undertaking conception.  
301. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
302. Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 433. The court in Pure Resources also observes that “[t]he 
[Delaware] Supreme Court [in Kahn] concluded that even a gauntlet of protective barriers like those 
would be insufficient protection because of (what I will term) the ‘inherent coercion’ that exists when a 
controlling stockholder announces its desire to buy the minority’s shares.” Id. at 436.  
303. See supra text accompanying notes 250–274. 
304. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1120–21; see also supra notes 261–271. 
305. Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 436. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 434. 
308. Id. at 434–35 (considering strong capital markets and wealth generation); see also id. at 437 
(referring to a “policy balance”). 











relations into the influence conception and we end up in a place in which 
fiduciary relations, which traditionally have nothing to do with influence, 
end up being all about influence. 309  
Figure 1. Kahn through the power/undertaking lens310 
 
 
309. For a more recent example of the hegemony of fiduciary influence see In re GGP, Inc 
Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0267, at 34–35 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2021), where the question of 
whether the defendant was a fiduciary depended on the exercise of power (see supra note 251) but the 
fiduciary obligation itself, if triggered, addressed “the concern . . . that fear of controller retribution in 
the face of a thwarted transaction may overbear a determination of the best corporate interest by the 
unaffiliated majority.” 












Figure 2. Kahn through Pure Resources’ influence lens 
 
As the nature and extent of coercion becomes the determinant of the 
nature of the review required to regulate the fiduciary’s loyalty—in this case 
whether there is a “duty to pay a fair price”311—the key issue for the court 
becomes transaction-structure comparison: which structure is more 
coercive?312 The logic works as follows in both mergers and tender offers: 
the majority shareholder is an influence fiduciary; fiduciary obligation is 
molded by courts to prevent coercion of shareholder decision making; the 
standard of review for a tender offer depends, therefore, on the comparative 
nature and extent of coercion in different going-private transaction 
structures. It follows that if a going-private tender offer is in certain respects 
as or more coercive than a merger, and yet it is subject to less onerous 
review (fair process only), then this is a doctrinal anomaly that needs 
correcting. As VC Strine observed, “[t]his disparity creates a possible 
 
311. See, e,g., In re Cox Commc’ns S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 624 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“In the 
later case of Pure Resources, this Court held that the mere fact that the controller had taken the Siliconix 
route did not relieve it of fiduciary duties. Although those duties did not include a duty to pay a fair price 
. . . .”). 
312. Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 441–42 (“The problem is that nothing about the tender offer 
method of corporate acquisition makes the 800–pound gorilla's retributive capabilities less daunting to 
minority stockholders. Indeed, many commentators would argue that the tender offer form is more 
coercive than a merger vote.”). 











incoherence in our law”313 between the approach in Kahn and in Solomon. 
However, in ignoring the power-based fiduciary structure, which arguably 
undergirds Kahn, Strine does not have sight of the precise nature of the 
doctrinal differences and possible incoherence.314  
Following a traditional fiduciary position—a position reflected in 
Delaware law prior to the 1970s315—if on the facts of Kahn or Weinberger 
the controlling shareholder exercises corporate power, then fairness review 
as to price follows as the product of exercising corporate power on both 
sides of the transaction, generating conflicts of interest and duty or of duty 
and duty. And although Weinberger tells us that entire fairness is fairness 
as to process and price, necessarily, if power is exercised, there is no fair 
process. And necessarily, if fair price review arose from an exercise of 
power by a power/undertaking fiduciary, there is no incoherence between 
that position and the failure to apply fair price review to a problem involving 
only influence and not power. If no power is exercised, as in Citron, then 
fairness review is the product of the potential to influence and undermine 
the voluntariness of the vote. In Citron, affirmed in Kahn, this may include 
fairness as to price, where the court is of the view that the inherent or 
structural coercion present in the deal cannot be neutralised by process 
protections. If at the time Pure Resources was decided316 such (influence 
induced) back-stop fair-price review was applicable in mergers but not 
applicable to tender offers, then here was the nature of a possible 
inconsistency. 
In Pure Resources, VC Strine’s transaction-coercion comparison results 
in going-private tender offers requiring the standard process protections—
independent board committees, minority of the majority thresholds, and the 
policing of parental threats317—without fair price review.318 He does not, as 
the reader of the judgment is led to expect,319 impose fairness review as to 
 
313. Id. at 435. See also Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Shareholders U. of 
Pa. L. Rev. 785, 825 (2003) referring to the “judicial disconnect between conflicting lines of doctrine” 
and “the doctrinal anomalies”. 
314. See also the discussion at supra note 248. Note also that VC Strine holds that the court in 
Solomon has a different understanding of coercion which is not cognisant of inherent or informal 
coercion as opposed to direct coercive threats (Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 438). It is, however, difficult 
to apply such a reading of coercion to Solomon that does not explore the issue of coercion in depth, in 
part because of the unusual nature of the offer which related to the enforcement of a security interest in 
89% of the shares in the target. In Solomon there was a special board committee but no majority of the 
minority requirement, which given the enforcement context would make little sense: the shareholders 
had two options—participation in the offer and foreclosure. Situated in the undue influence doctrine, it 
is clear that as of the time of the Solomon judgment, and long before it, coercive interference in 
voluntariness could take many case- and relationship-specific forms.  
315. See supra text accompanying notes 185–210. 
316. See supra note 247. 
317. Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 445. 
318. Id. at 445–46. 












price, but holds out its threat in the absence of such process protections;320 
a position which is, as noted, wholly consistent with the stand-alone undue 
influence doctrine.321 The paradox of Pure Resources, and the development 
of Delaware law that enables it, is that it offers and affirms a remaking of 
the fiduciary relation and of the structure of fiduciary obligation,322 and yet, 
after all its conceptual and substantive demolition and rebuilding, it ends up, 
in relation to outcome, in exactly the same place that the ghost of Lord 
Eldon and his American progeny would have ended up in.323 As “judicial 
carpentry,”324 it is analogous to breaking apart a wooden bench, remaking it 
in exactly the same form and then asserting that the bench is your creation. 
In some respects that is, of course, true, but the claim seems to omit 
something fundamental about the story of the bench.  
But the decision’s congruence with foundational English and U.S. 
jurisprudence, does not mean the decision, its reasoning, and its conceptual 
apparatus, are without consequence. The decision’s prominence has 
crystalized Delaware’s remaking of the nature of the fiduciary relation since 
the 1970s.325 Through the influence-fiduciary lens, fiduciary obligation has 
been transformed in Delaware corporate law, realizing the risks of 
fiduciarizing the transactional regulation of influence outlined in Section 
I.B.2 above.326 Delaware has moved from an understanding of fiduciary 
duty that involved endogenous and discrete obligations which regulate the 
exercise of delegated power and are the product of the undertaking to use 
that power in a specified way, to exogenous judicially crafted obligations 
which are the product of being designated with fiduciary influence status. 
Figures 1 and 2 graphically represent this transformation using Kahn.327 
In the former, duty is the product of the undertaking to use transferred 
power for a particular purpose on behalf of or for another, and a person is a 
fiduciary because she has given that undertaking and owes these duties.328 
These endogenous duties—the duties to exercise power in good faith and to 
avoid conflicts of duty and interest—are not the deductive and non-
exhaustive product of a person being designated a fiduciary or of a more 
elemental duty of loyalty, although clearly both enforce the loyal exercise 
of power. But when the influence conception of fiduciary relations 
 
320. Id. at 445–46. 
321. See supra note 77 and 297. 
322. See supra text accompanying notes 91–97. 
323. See supra text accompanying notes 72–90 and 147–157 and infra note 352. 
324. Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 434. 
325. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 624 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re 
CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 407 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
326. See supra Section II.B.2. 
327. See supra Figures 1 and 2. 
328. See supra Figure 1. 











colonizes and replaces the power/undertaking framework, duties 
necessarily can no longer be rooted in power, as they can be owed, just as 
they were in Pure Resources or in Citron, in the absence of the transfer or 
usurpation of power. Fiduciary duties are thereby detached from their 
source and must be grafted on to a distinct conception; a conception that has 
no means of explaining fiduciary obligation apart from attributing it to the 
imposition of a broad other-regarding loyalty obligation in relation to the 
dominated, the inferior, and the vulnerable. 329  Fiduciary duties thereby 
become, inevitably, the product of being a fiduciary—a person once 
designated as an influence-fiduciary becomes subject to a duty of loyalty, 
of which fairness review (the original and only product of the undue 
influence doctrine)330 is merely one component part of an incomplete and 
unspecified duty-whole.331 In this regard, although one has to be wary of 
drawing causal conclusions from descriptive statistics,332 it is noteworthy at 
least that the use of the corporate “duty of loyalty” in the context of fiduciary 
relations tracks the introduction and subsequent dominance of the influence 
conception in Delaware law, from 1 use of the term prior to 1960, 4 prior to 
1980, 64 prior to 1990, and 996 prior to 2020.333 
 
329. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97. 
330. See supra text accompanying notes 71–90. 
331. See, e.g., Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 498 (Del. Ch. 1990) 
(applying the influence conception). In Citron, plaintiff argued that the defendant as “majority 
shareholder, breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to [the] minority shareholders.” Id. at 498. 
332. Clearly there are multiple other drivers, including case load. See generally: John Armour, 
Bernard S. Black, and Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 134 (2012), and 
KERSHAW note 3 at 198-200 and 451 noting the paucity of Delaware case law as of the mid-twentieth 
century in relation to several duties. 
333. Based on Westlaw search term (“duty of loyalty” and fiduciary) in the Delaware cases 












Figure 3. Use of the term “Duty of Loyalty” in Delaware case law 
 
Moreover, this conceptual colonization not only disrupts the nature and 
structure of fiduciary relations and transforms what it means to be a 
fiduciary, it also necessarily transforms in a corporate context the possible 
recipients of such duties. Through this conception, fiduciary duties no 
longer exclusively relate to the corporate person and the exercise of its 
power, but they may be owed to and enforced directly by those corporate 
constituents who find themselves in relations of inferiority, domination, and 
vulnerability with other constituents. Duties owed from majority to minority 
shareholders provide the most embedded example of this, but there are 
others to which the article turns in Part III below.334  
III. THE COLONIZING EFFECT OF FIDUCIARY INFLUENCE: FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES TO CREDITORS 
Whether and to what extent the interest of creditors must be furthered by 
directors when they exercise corporate power and whether, when a 
corporation is insolvent or approaching insolvency, directors owe a direct 
duty of care to creditors, are questions that have been addressed in multiple 
 
334. In Section III, we explore one of the non-transactional implications of the effect of the 
fiduciary influence standard. There are several others, but space constraints mean that they cannot be 
addressed here. Consider, for example, Delaware law’s chaotic position on the difference between direct 
and derivative actions. In this regard, in Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110 (Del. Ch. 2004), Chancellor 
Chandler observed in relation to the law on direct and derivative actions that it offered a “state of affairs 
. . . conducive to expensive litigation . . . and [fell] woefully short of providing coherent guidance to this 
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jurisdictions in recent years, including Delaware.335 Most recently in the 
United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal held uncontroversially that directors 
did not owe a direct duty to creditors, but rather owed their duties to the 
company,336 which in certain instances could involve treating as paramount 
the interests of creditors. 337  This position firmly reflects the 
power/undertaking lens.338 Through this lens a director could only be a 
fiduciary for an individual creditor or group of creditors if she had 
separately undertaken to act on the creditors’ behalf and had been 
empowered by the creditors to do so. But, necessarily, in relation to the 
directorial fiduciary position she is appointed by the corporation and 
exercises corporate power. The fiduciary duty she owes as a director is, 
therefore, owed only to the corporation.  
Modern Delaware courts, however, have found this question much more 
difficult to answer. The driver of this difficulty is the infusion of the 
influence conception of the fiduciary. Where fiduciary relations can arise 
merely because of “a condition of superiority of one of the parties over the 
other,”339 corporate relations can be fiduciarized when the court deems the 
superiority one constituent has over another—an “overmastering” 
influence340—to be significant enough to justify the fiduciary designation. 
When it does so, the superior party as a fiduciary owes fiduciary duties—
duties of loyalty—to the person who is, or is capable of being, detrimentally 
affected.  
Creditors are exposed in insolvent and approaching-insolvency 
companies to actions by directors that could detrimentally affect them. 
Directors are clearly in a position of superiority over them in relation to their 
interests. 341  Accordingly, within the influence-fiduciary conception it is 
arguable that directors and majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties to 
creditors. Indeed, the logic of the idea of superiority provides a strong bias 
in favour of such a finding, requiring good policy reasons to resist 
instantiating such a new fiduciary status. Any such duty would be owed to 
the creditors directly and not enforced derivatively (because these duties are 
not owed to the corporation).  
This is precisely the conversational path that we have seen in the 
Delaware courts; importantly it is a conversation that would never have 
 
335. See Amir Licht, My Creditor’s Keeper: Escalation of Commitment and Custodial Fiduciary 
Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1732 (2021). 
336. BTI 2014 LLC v. Sequana S.A. [2019] EWCA Civ 112, [149]. 
337. Id. at [219]-[220]. 
338. Although, for a recent and important departure, see Lehtimäki v. Cooper [2020] UKSC 33.  
339. Peyton v. William C. Peyton Corp., 7 A.2d 737, 747 (Del. 1939). 
340. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
341. On the risk profile of decision making and expropriation of value from creditors, see Hayne 












happened without the importation of the fiduciary influence conception. 
Consider first Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.,342 
also a judgment given by Vice Chancellor Strine, delivered two years after 
Pure Resources. VC Strine provides a superb deconstruction of the effects 
of creditor-regarding duties in the zone of insolvency and affirms the 
mainstream understanding of the relationship of creditors343 to directorial 
fiduciary duties when the company is insolvent—that they remain owed to 
the corporation, but the interests furthered in acting on behalf of the 
corporation shift from shareholders to creditors. He observed, for example, 
that “the fact of insolvency does not change the primary object of the 
director’s duties, which is the firm itself.”344 Yet alongside this standard 
account he entertains the idea that directly enforceable fiduciary duties 
could be owed to particular “injured creditor[s].”345 He similarly entertains 
the idea that where board action is “not injurious to the firm as a whole but 
injurious to particular stockholders,”346 that a fiduciary duty could be owed 
to those minority shareholders who could assert a “direct duty of loyalty 
claim[] . . . .”347 However, aware of the considerable practical and policy 
difficulties arising from parallel directorial duties owed to the corporation 
and separately to particular creditors or shareholders, Strine declined to 
provide a definitive answer as to whether such direct duties could be owed.  
Taking seriously the idea of direct fiduciary obligation to creditors bears 
the firm imprint of the fiduciary influence conception which underpinned 
Strine’s judgment in Pure Resources: a director owes fiduciary duties to 
another constituency where her superior position enables her to act in ways 
that detrimentally affect that constituency. Moreover, we see here the 
realization of the risks, highlighted above, associated with fiduciarizing the 
undue influence doctrine—the generation of loyalty obligations which are 
unconnected to transactions between the fiduciary and the effected person, 
which are a corollary of fiduciary designation, and whose content is 
dependent only on judicial carpentry.348  
This question of direct fiduciary obligation was revisited and rejected by 
the Delaware Supreme Court in North American Catholic Educational 
Programming Foundation v. Gheewalla. 349  The manner of rejection is 
important, as it assumes the legitimacy of a direct fiduciary claim, whilst 
rejecting it for pragmatic and policy reasons. For the Delaware Supreme 
 
342. 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).  
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348. See supra note 307. 
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Court, it is the “uncertainty” and the conflict of duties (to the corporation 
and the creditors) that such a duty would create,350 which are the reasons for 
the court’s conclusion that creditors cannot assert direct claims for breach 
of duty.351 In the Supreme Court’s decision we see the deep uncertainty 
contained within the application of the influence conception: it has no limit. 
Everywhere in corporate and non-corporate life there are situations in which 
one person is in a position to detrimentally affect another. The economic 
agency framework similarly teaches us that there are economic agency 
problems everywhere. But what are the circumstances in which such an 
“agent” is to be subject to fiduciary relations? As in Gheewalla, recourse 
can be had to pragmatic and policy considerations in order to delineate the 
concept’s boundaries, but this form of analysis rarely provides 
uncontentious clarity and closure, and readily serves as cover for personal 
judicial preference. Of course, the non-fiduciary version of the undue 
influence doctrine faces a similar difficulty, but the uncertainty is 
significantly curtailed by the transaction-only context in which it applies. 
CONCLUSION 
Readers will be tired by now of this article’s reminder that the different 
guises of fairness review we find in modern Delaware law are, on closer 
inspection, very old legal wine in very new Delaware bottles. Delaware law 
merely reprises Lord Eldon’s fiduciary and undue influence jurisprudence, 
which can account for every aspect of Delaware’s doctrine of entire fairness 
review in relation to both price and process.352 This is a subsidiary insight 
of the article whose primary focus is on the evolution of the concept of the 
fiduciary, but it is of some importance for understanding the nature of 
 
350. Id. at 103. 
351. Id. 
352. See supra text accompanying notes 147–157.  Of course, for the purpose of clarification in 
relation the English law position, when it comes to exercise of power (not influence) in situations of 
conflict, English law regularly asserts, as did Eldon himself, that it is not interested in fairness, 
suggesting a profound disconnect between this claim and such anti-fairness judicial sentiment (most 
famously, in Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Brothers [1854] All ER Rep. 249). However, due to the 
flexibility of governance rules in UK companies, English law has never to date explored in depth the 
implications of being in breach of the duty and the remedial consequences thereof. See KERSHAW, supra 
note 3, at 309–21. As noted above and explored elsewhere, see supra notes 228–238 and accompanying 
text, remedial fairness arose not from deploying fairness in the determination of whether there was 
conflict but from determining the remedial consequences of their being a conflict. In the foundational 
case of Gardner v. Butler, 30 N.J. Eq. 702 (N.J. 1879), the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals held 
that in such circumstances the breaching director would be entitled to the “reasonabl[e] worth” of or 
“just compensation” for what he provided. Id. at 709–11. Of interest for the UK position is that Gardner 
v. Butler cites the English case of Great Luxembourg Railway Co. v. Magnay, where Romilly MR held 
that “when it is said that he cannot make any profit by the transaction, it is not meant that he is not to 
have the proper value of the property which is actually taken . . . by the company . . . .” Great 












Delaware law and for theories that explain corporate legal change. The 
modern theoretical reflex is to explain corporate legal change by reference 
to either extra-legal pressures—whether arising from, inter alia, charter 
competition, 353  repeat-player litigation, 354  or the role of institutional 
shareholders 355 —or to judicial activism that carves rules from policy 
concerns and market needs and expectations.356 But if Delaware law, as it is 
in the case of going-privates, is actually embedded in a deep legal path 
dependency—or at least a continued commitment to a solutional “common 
sense” generated by the early cases—then the above accounts of legal 
change have little to work with, because so little has changed.  
The primary contribution of the article is that it reveals the late-
twentieth-century change in Delaware’s conception of the fiduciary and the 
structural alteration to fiduciary obligation which it portends. The triumph 
of the influence conception of fiduciary relations transforms fiduciary 
obligation. In its traditional conception, fiduciary obligation is wedded to a 
delegation of power, is born of the undertaking related to the use of that 
power and regulates the exercise of that power though discrete and limited 
loyalty-focused obligations. By contrast, the influence conception generates 
fiduciary obligation without a transfer of power, threatening fiduciary 
obligation when one corporate constituency is in a position of superiority in 
relation to another. In this conception, fiduciary obligation becomes the 
product of fiduciary designation and is sourced from a broad and 
unspecified duty of loyalty, located in the workshop of the judicial 
carpenter. This transforms what it means to be a fiduciary and who can 
become a fiduciary. It transforms the source and potential extent of fiduciary 
obligation. And it transforms the structural relationship between fiduciary 
duties and fiduciary status. It is this surreptitious conceptual and structural 
shift which drives legal connections in Delaware corporate fiduciary law 
that did not exist before and enables legal arguments that made no sense 
before. All of which has enabled a dramatic empowerment of the Delaware 
judiciary as lawmaker.  
In practice, as Gheewalla evidences, the risks of extending the reach of 
fiduciary designation or expanding the breadth of fiduciary obligation often 
will not be realized as sophisticated judges—aware of the implications for 
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managers, judicial legitimacy, corporate development, and Delaware’s 
corporate law leadership-role—recoil from such extension and expansion. 
However, the possibilities generated by the fiduciary influence conception 
will continue to serve the plaintiff bar and the bench in generating a plethora 
of legal claims, and some of the time these claims may slip through the 
cracks. When they do, we need to be aware of why they became claims in 
the first place. Attention to Delaware’s fiduciary imagination would serve 
us well when that happens. 
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